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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE “LIBERATED” 
 
“In the name of religion… they are being kidnapped and killed and raped. 
And no one is mentioning it.” – Haifa Zangana1 
 
 
Saha Hussein al-Haideri was a successful Iraqi journalist and mother of three, known for 
her reporting on Islamist militias. She was “liberated” on June 7, 2007 in Mosul at the 
hands of Ansar al-Islam, a Kurdish Sunni militia known for its more radical 
interpretations of Islam, particularly with regard to women.2 Zeena al-Qushtani, an Iraqi 
human rights activist, was often seen clad in the latest Western fashions. Her “liberation” 
occurred in the summer of 2005, upon which she was bestowed an abaya, a black 
garment that covers most of a woman’s body excluding the face and hands, complete 
with a chilling farewell written across her body: “She was a collaborator against Islam.”3 
Then there are those whose professions were less prominent, whose names were lost or 
unreported amidst the hundreds of undocumented casualties, but whose “liberations” are 
no less horrific. In May of 2006, two young girls were abducted from Amariya for not 
wearing hijab, a headscarf worn by some Muslim women. Their “liberation” consisted of 
gang rape and head shaving. Another 23-year-old with uncovered hair was “permanently 
disfigured” when militants doused her in acid in the name of Allah.4 According to 
Riverbend, a widely-read female Iraqi blogger writing under a pseudonym for security 
reasons, “a girl wearing jeans risks being attacked, abducted, or insulted by 
fundamentalists who have been…liberated!”5  
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These brutal realities of “liberation” lie in stark contrast to some of the justifications for 
the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. Even a few months prior to the invasion, 
Bush already set the stage for some of the rhetoric that would come to characterize the 
U.S.’ role in the region: “These nations can show by their example that honest 
government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can 
triumph in the Middle East and beyond.”6 Continuing with his speech that marked the 
commencement of war on March 20, 2003, President George W. Bush championed U.S. 
presence in Iraq as a fight “to free [Iraq’s] people.”7 Other rhetoric throughout the Bush 
administration more specifically alluded to the plight of Iraqi women, thereby portraying 
the U.S. as the gallant liberator of a broken and backward people. In a speech on March 
14, 2004, President George W. Bush proclaimed that “the advance of women’s rights and 
the advance of liberty are ultimately inseparable.”8 Subsequent remarks that made the 
case for war cited female oppression, including the “us[e of] women and children as 
human shields,” “public whippings of women,” and the “deni[al] of schooling”—all 
amidst a reign of “theocratic terror.”9  
 
Additionally, Slate Magazine compiled a chronology of a number of occasions upon 
which a member of the Bush administration referred to the eradication of Iraqi “rape 
rooms,” a sound byte widely disseminated in an effort to, at least in part, justify the U.S. 
invasion. The article cites fourteen references10 between 2003 and 2004 alone (each of 
which is nearly identical in syntax and wording), which naively assumed that the capture 
and overthrow of Saddam Hussein necessarily translated into universal freedom: “The 
Iraqi people are now free;”11 “Every woman in Iraq is better off because the rape rooms 
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and torture chambers of Saddam Hussein are forever closed.”12 The stories of Saha 
Hussein al-Haideri, Zeena al-Qushtani, and the numerous others suggest that U.S. 
officials may have spoken far too soon.  
 
As a partial justification for invasion, the U.S. treated Iraqi women as symbolic 
manifestations of a region that must be rescued and freed from oppression, a phenomenon 
bearing uncanny resemblance to the British justifications for colonial rule in Egypt 
beginning in 1882.13 Clearly, the use of women as a metaphorical or rhetorical instrument 
for legitimizing occupation is not a recent phenomenon. In any case, despite the 
undeniable oppression under Saddam Hussein, his overthrow did not result in an end to 
violence, particularly against women. In this way, geopolitics and feminism become 
interconnected so as to support the overthrow of “oppressive” regimes.14  
 
Nevertheless, the notion of women as objects to be defended exists on both fronts. It is 
perhaps a natural reaction for those who feel victimized to cling to key elements of their 
identities as a means of protecting that which has come under attack. The hijab 
(headscarf), for instance, is a tangible means of “differentiating Iraqi society from the 
‘foreign culture’” of the West.15 As such, U.S. attempts to free Iraqi women from their 
“veiled oppression” only further fuel the desire to cling more closely to tradition—to act 
in a way that reaffirms Iraqi identity as something entirely unique and preferable to that 
of the U.S.16  While the U.S. upholds women as a partial rationalization for invasion and 
occupation, women—and many of the political issues associated with them, such as the 
veil and family law—are simultaneously used to legitimize efforts against the U.S. 
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invasion: “Resistance to U.S. imperialism and Western cultural encroachment is 
symbolically articulated through gender ideologies and relations. ’Our women are 
different from your women!’ has been a phrase used in the context of communal and 
naturalist tensions and struggles…”17 Unfortunately, the use of women as a rhetorical and 
symbolic tool for legitimization at times results in appalling psychological and physical 
violence toward women, as is the case at present in Iraq.  
 
This response to the invasion is exacerbated to a perhaps unforeseen extreme due, in part, 
to the escalating prominence of Islamist political parties and their affiliated militias. The 
chaotic decentralized environment of post-2003 Iraq allowed “violence and criminality” 
to thrive.18 Conservative Sunni and Shiia militants who were forcefully suppressed under 
Saddam Hussein celebrated their new freedoms, asserting and enforcing their 
interpretations of Islam though religiously-justified threats and violence in the event of 
noncompliance. Much of this violence is targeted toward women, as “symbolic markers 
of the break from the nominally secular…regime… The violence against women is 
essential in enforcing this new gender ideology, which is also propagated by politicians 
and mosque imams.”19 Indeed, the nexus between political Islamist parties and their 
militant counterparts is one that has not been thoroughly explored, particularly in 
assessing the validity of religious justifications for psychological and physical violence 
against women. The ensuing analysis will at least partially attempt to fill this void, 
linking a wealth of scholarship on women’s rights in Islam with the present realities of 
on-the-ground violence in Iraq.  
 
 
 
9
The Significance of Deconstructing Islamist Arguments against Women and the 
Challenges of the Iraqi Case 
 
 
Though the Iraqi case study is a crucial component of my analysis, the specifics of my 
ensuing argument cannot be understood without first cultivating knowledge of Islam’s 
basic principles and sources. There is no shortage of scholarship on the topic of women’s 
rights in Islam.20 As injustices against women prevailed after the institutionalization of 
Islam21, numerous scholars worked toward cultivating the notion that religious 
justifications for misogyny are not inherently Islamic. Upon deeper analysis and 
investigation of the original sources of Islam, notably the Qur’an, Sunna (the Prophet’s 
Example), and hadith,22 it becomes apparent that institutionalized Islam constitutes a 
sometimes drastic violation of the Prophet Muhammad’s highly revered example and the 
messages of egalitarianism inherent in the Qur’an.23 Fazlur Rahman, in his preeminent 
work Major Themes of the Qur’an, emphasizes that like the Qur’an itself, modern 
applications of Islamic women’s rights must be put into context; these laws and practices 
are not infallible nor are they necessarily grounded in infallible religious truths.24 
 
Recent scholarship, particularly that of Amina Wadud, Leila Ahmed, Asma Barlas, and 
Barbara Stowasser, among others, contributes to what Wadud calls the “hermeneutical 
model” for Qur’anic exegesis.25 The model focuses extensively on linguistic analyses of 
key passages, an appreciation of the scripture as a complete and gradualist whole, and an 
awareness of the historical and present-day context.26 This extensive scholarship will 
largely inform the first half of this thesis, and will specifically rely on Wadud’s 
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framework as a guide in assessing the nature of the claims made by those Iraqi religious 
extremists purporting to “liberate” women.  
 
Despite the vast array of theoretical sources on women in Islam, there exists a dearth of 
information with regard to the subject’s more tangible implications for Iraq, and Iraqi 
women specifically. Even putting aside the challenges of unpredictability inherent in 
researching such a volatile region, gender-based violence against women is an issue that 
remains tragically underreported. Most of the accessible literature on the subject appears 
in the form of occasional news articles from both U.S. and foreign news outlets such as 
the Washington Post, IRIN, and New York Times. This reporting is useful in chronicling 
the geographic distribution of violence, as well as specific reported incidents, but lacks 
more extensive analysis or detail. Although major human rights organizations, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,27 do address violence against Iraqi 
women in some of their annual reports, their coverage is cursory at best, as their analyses 
tend to focus on the entire gamut of issues in Iraq rather than women’s concerns in 
particular. The U.S. State Department’s most up-to-date Human Rights Report on Iraq 
(2008) is slightly more constructive than the aforementioned publications, offering 
statistics and anecdotal evidence of violence specifically against women. Nevertheless, it 
still lacks the details and comprehensive analyses necessary to understand the intricacies 
of the matter.28 
  
Organizations based in and focused exclusively on Iraq come much closer to reaching the 
heart of the issue at hand. Groups such as Women Living under Muslim Laws 
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(WLUML)29, Organization for Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI)30, and MADRE31 seek 
to expose extremist violence against women in more detail, while simultaneously offering 
strategies for reform. Like the news articles and international human rights reports, 
however, most of these groups’ research is focused on specific facts as opposed to 
analysis and deconstruction of the violence itself.  
 
Aside from journal articles and news reports, there are very few books on the subject of 
women in Iraq published in the post-2003 period. Most research in the few existing 
books, such as What Kind of Liberation? by Nadje al-Ali and City of Widows: An Iraqi 
Women’s Account of War and Resistance by Haifa Zangana, is largely anecdotal. Thus a 
great deal of the information I rely on in the following analysis stems from secondhand 
reports of observations on the ground as opposed to quantitative data. Nadje al-Ali, in 
particular, is one of the first authors to truly draw a connection between political Islamist 
groups and their militant counterparts on the streets of Iraq. Women’s challenges with 
gender-based violence are not limited solely to the physical violence they experience at 
the hands of militias preaching religious justifications. Perhaps more crucially, their 
challenges extend into the political realm, where legally-recognized Islamist parties take 
power and use their influence to enforce a more psychological sort of violence—one that 
attacks women’s rights through legal doctrine while simultaneously ignoring the actions 
of their militant counterparts.  This frequently-ignored relationship is one I seek to 
explore more thoroughly here, as I strive to invalidate these religiously-validated 
misogynistic viewpoints through original Islamic sources and principles.  
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The purpose of this thesis is three-fold: 1) to emphasize the critical importance of 
cultivating a deep understanding of Islam’s intended view of women as put forth through 
the foundational sources themselves; 2) to expose the underreported realities of the ever-
escalating post-Saddam violence against women in the name of religion; and 3) to offer a 
policy proposal, namely that, at least with respect to Iraqi women, the key to liberation in 
the post-Saddam era is not through secular strategies or solutions, but instead, through 
non-secular arguments and interpretations, indeed through Islam itself.  Ultimately, this 
thesis is intended to represent one of the first comprehensive applications of existing 
Islamic exegesis on women’s rights to the current Iraqi case.  
 
I will argue that a linguistic and historically-contextual analysis of Islam’s sources—the 
Qur’an, Sunna, and hadith—will reveal the inherent fallacies in religiously-extremist 
views on women. Relying on works by Islamic scholars, anecdotal evidence, and 
interviews with pundits on the Iraqi case, I will demonstrate the capacity for religion to 
play a constructive and liberating role in Iraqi reconstruction. I will emphasize the 
existence of violent misogyny on two levels, both psychological through Islamist political 
parties, and physical, at the hands of Sunni and Shiia militias in the areas far beyond the 
reach of Baghdad’s centralized pocket of control. In the name of religion, Iraqi women 
are thereby facing a variegated array of threats against their freedom, both through legal 
proposals that seek to unravel the more progressive Iraqi Family Law of 1959 and 
through death threats and assassinations for “crimes” such as forgetting to wear hijab or 
applying makeup.  Despite the lack of numerous concrete data or facts concerning Iraqi 
women’s struggle with violence, the heart of the issue does not require such details. The 
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crux of the analysis herein will instead offer a new and critical perspective on how to 
counter Islamist religious-based violence against women in Iraq, not through secular 
reform but through religion itself.  
 
Outline of Text and Concluding Remarks 
 
Chapter Two will focus predominantly on the theological arguments that demonstrate 
Islam’s capacity for countering misogyny. The chapter will systematically examine 
demonstrative examples from Prophet Muhammad’s life and the Qur’anic verses most 
relevant to issues pertaining to women’s rights and equality in an effort to deconstruct 
some of the more extreme Islamist justifications for violence against women in Iraq. 
Many more conservative Islamic interpretations or arguments in favor of female 
subservience are reliant on carefully chosen Qur’anic verses for legitimacy. Devoid of 
context and a thorough explanation of each Arabic term’s array of potential meanings, 
these arguments fail to adequately portray Islam’s progressive potential with regard to 
gender relations in general, and women’s rights more specifically. As such, Chapter Two 
will attempt to undermine the perception that Islam is an inherently misogynistic faith by 
examining the historical context and the linguistic specifics of key verses. Doing so will 
provide a more holistic view of the Qur’an and reveal the role each verse plays in 
furthering the Qur’an’s greater thematic messages and prescriptions. Finally, Chapter 
Two will provide the necessary background information and theological justifications 
that undergird my recommended strategy for ensuring greater security for women in Iraq. 
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Chapter Three will investigate the intricacies of the on-the-ground realities in Iraq with 
regard to threats specifically targeting women. A brief background on the evolution of 
women’s rights in Iraq, as well as an examination of the development of Iraqi politics 
since the 2003 invasion, will provide the necessary context to accurately understand 
today’s complex situation. After conveying this background knowledge, however 
cursory, Chapter Three will chronicle the troubling circumstances surrounding many 
Iraqi women’s existences. It will look at religious-based violence as it exists 
psychologically within the legal sphere, as well as physically within individual 
communities and towns, offering a glimpse into some of the challenges Iraqi women face 
on a day-to-day basis.  
 
The final chapter will draw a clear connection between the preceding sections, applying 
the specific theological analyses of Chapter Two to the largely anecdotal evidence of 
Chapter Three as a means of promoting a seemingly counterintuitive combative strategy. 
Rather than remove religion from the equation entirely, Chapter Four advocates a 
strategy that perhaps even more potently relies on Islamic sources and arguments to 
deconstruct some of the more misogynistic Islamist interpretations.  The U.S. invaded 
Iraq armed with secular rhetoric that preached its intention to free Iraqi women from 
repression. That this rhetoric ironically permeated an environment marked by rising 
subjugation and gender-based violence suggests that it may be time to seek an alternative 
strategy, one that is more sensitive to the Islam practiced and revered by the vast majority 
of Muslims throughout the world, and the Islam that is so essential to Iraqi culture and 
people.32 Rather than alienate the Islamist parties that have recently gained political 
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prowess or further fuel the cycle of misunderstanding that exists between “West” and 
“East,” the U.S. must embrace the reality that a country governed under Islamic 
principles is not necessarily one that is repressive and violent toward women. Quite to the 
contrary, a country governed by Islamic principles, if based on the faith’s founding ideals 
and overriding themes, is more than equipped to counteract extremism and violence 
performed in the name of Islam. 
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Chapter 2 
UNVEILING ISLAM’S INHERENT 
EGALITARIANISM 
 
“When looking at photographs in the context of social history, a number of other forms of meaning have to 
be taken into consideration. These include the context in which the photograph was taken; the relationships 
of power and authority between photographer and subject; the aesthetic and ideological considerations 
which affected the photographer’s choice of subject and the way the photograph might be interpreted by its 
viewers in a particular historical period.” 
- Sarah Graham-Brown in Images of Women33 
 
 
Iraqi violence against women is difficult to combat when such actions are performed in 
the name of Islam.  This is only further complicated when such violence occurs in a time 
of heightened conflict and chaos. As Iraqi blogger, Riverbend, states in her blog, “Why is 
it so very surprising that in times of calamity people turn to religion? It happens all over 
the world. During tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, blockades, wars—people turn to 
deities… It’s simple—when all else fails, there is always a higher power for most 
people.”34 Devoid of any semblance of stability, people view religion as a source of 
comfort and permanence—and thereby something that is more difficult to challenge. This 
issue is only exacerbated when coupled with the fact that Islamic law, or shari’ah, has 
not been modified since its codification nearly 1300 years ago. Rather than read the 
Islamic sources for themselves, many people have resorted to somewhat of a blind sense 
of trust in those who purport to be well-versed in Islamic sources and truths. 
 
Some of these “Islamic experts,” however—including many of the Iraqi Islamists—offer 
somewhat of a more twisted version of Islamic theology and history, selectively 
manipulated so as to serve personal interests for power or political support. These 
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extremists buttress their misogynistic views toward women through selective Qur’anic 
verses devoid of context or references to antiquated Islamic laws that sharply contrast 
with Qur’anic provisions.  Indeed, Islamist injustices toward women purported to be 
justified through shari’ah do not actually possess religious justification according to the 
Islamic sources—an argument that is instrumental in eradicating Islamist violence against 
women in Iraq at present. In scholar Theresa Saliba’s words: “…it is not Islam per se that 
oppresses women, but, rather, the continuity of patriarchal values within nationalist and 
religious ideologies that limits women’s agency.”35 More and more, feminists are 
advocating a return to the divine sources of Islam as a means of securing greater social 
freedoms, arguing that a true Islamic system of governance should be rooted in the core 
elements of the religion itself, not in centuries worth of patriarchal interpretation and 
outside influences.36  
 
More progressive scholars such as Amina Wadud and Fazlur Rahman suggest that an 
understanding of the Qur’an’s true principles of guidance can only be achieved through 
first cultivating a conception of individual asbab al-nuzul, or circumstances of 
revelation—circumstances that encompass not only historical context, but the subtleties 
surrounding each verse’s linguistic composition and its role as one portion of a greater 
whole. Rather than isolating selective passages from the Qur’an or individual hadith, this 
approach to Qur’anic analysis and understanding instead considers the fundamental 
themes that run throughout the various revelations as a whole. Each verse contributes to 
at least some aspect of the Qur’an’s overarching Weltanschauung, or all-encompassing 
worldview.37 Especially when dealing with more extreme or conservative interpretations 
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of Islam like those used to justify violence against women in Iraq, it is critical to be able 
to cultivate a complete contextual understanding of the circumstances under which each 
verse was revealed and the ways in which its message fits in with the rest of the Qur’an’s 
themes and prescriptive guidance.   
 
It is through such an exhaustive study that one can uncover what Wadud terms the 
“spirit” of Islam—those broader ideals that must be “practical[ly] appli[ed]” to current 
conditions “in accordance with how that original intention is reflected or manifested.”38 
When applied to those Qur’anic verses relevant to women, an analysis centered around 
this multifaceted interpretation of the asbab al-nuzul offers a religiously-centered 
argument in favor of women’s equality and freedom. The following pages will provide 
the theological underpinnings for what I will argue is the most promising means of 
combating Iraqi gender-based violence. Arguably, the most promising mechanism for 
eradicating patriarchy within Islam is a critique of historically-entrenched interpretations 
of the fundamental text itself, beginning quite logically with those verses pertaining to the 
inception of humanity. 
 
Brief Background: The Jahaliyyah  
 
The Qu’ran is revered as the literal word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in 
the 7th century CE. As opposed to a book of law, the Qur’an constructs a moral and 
ethical ideal, serving as a “book of moral persuasion and revelation” intended to inspire a 
life of moral conviction and guidance.39  The verses are not organized in chronological 
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order, but instead are distributed in somewhat of an ad hoc manner, having been acquired 
over a period of twenty years under varying circumstances. Together, the verses present a 
number of “specifically contextualized” prescriptions for humankind’s idealized state of 
being, thereby warranting a full and thorough reading of the text. Throughout the period 
of revelation, changing conditions resulted in seemingly-contradictory verses that warrant 
reassessment through naskh, or abrogation, wherein later verses cancel out the former.40  
Such a process instills the Qur’an with the acknowledgment that “it is not the text or its 
principles that change, but the capacity and particularity of the understanding and 
reflection of the principles of a text within a community of people” that change.41   
 
The Qur’anic prescriptions’ capacity for continual development and adaptation to shifting 
circumstances is evident in the manner in which the Qur’an was revealed. Verses were 
not revealed haphazardly and, in fact, occasionally constituted direct responses to precise 
historical occurrences. In this way, some of the Qur’an’s explicit messages were intended 
solely as guidance for a particular situation. In these cases, it is again crucial to extract 
and consider the broader themes that can be applied to any person in any time period 
while remaining cognizant of the asbab al-nuzul.  
 
A well-known illustrative example is Sura 24:11-26 which cautions against slandering a 
chaste woman: “Those who slander chaste women, indiscreet but believing, are cursed in 
this life and in the Hereafter: for them is a grievous Penalty.” The verse was revealed 
immediately following an incident involving Aisha, the Prophet Muhammad’s youngest 
and most beloved wife. While searching for a lost necklace, Aisha was accidentally left 
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behind at a camp in the middle of the desert. She was eventually given a ride back to 
town by a kind gentleman who happened upon the lost girl, after which she became the 
subject of scandal and was inappropriately accused of unfaithfulness. The 
aforementioned sura was a direct response to this event, serving a dual purpose of 
clearing Aisha’s name, as well as more broadly cautioning against gossip and slander.42 
The specific people and occurrences in the verse may possess more circumscribed 
applicability, but the revelation’s underlying themes can be much more universally 
understood. Society itself is “cumulative” and Islam, therefore, has within its very core an 
embedded fluidity and gradualism that allows for the prospect of future evolution.43  
 
Taken in its historical context in comparison to pre-Islamic Arabia, or the Jahiliyya 
(‘time of ignorance’), the Qur’an was extraordinarily revolutionary in its treatment 
towards women. Prior to the advent of Islam, women “were deemed to be chattels”—
objects to be bought and sold at whim.44 Once acquired, the “wife was the property of the 
husband” and possessed no legal or social rights whatsoever.45 Devoid of rights such as 
those of inheritance and divorce, women were also regularly confronted with forced 
marriages, unrestricted polygamy, and rampant female infanticide, or the killing of baby 
girls.46 With society primarily centered on the advancement of the tribe, women served as 
the key toward ensuring each group’s continued survival. The purpose of marriage, then, 
was not primarily for love or companionship, but instead for procreation.47 There were, in 
fact, over ten forms of forced marriages, many of which treated the woman as property to 
be inherited, captured, traded, or purchased. One of the most reviled forms of marriage in 
pre-Islamic Arabia was that of mut’a, or temporary marriage. Essentially marriages of 
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convenience, temporary marriages offered men the opportunity for physical pleasure 
without any sort of long-term commitment. Mut’a marriages were subject to the whim of 
each individual “husband,” who could terminate the agreement at will after he felt 
thoroughly satisfied.48 
 
The advent of Islam marked a tangible shift in the status of women, as the Qur’an 
challenged many of these misogynistic pre-Islamic conceptions and “also conferred rights 
on women in the seventh century that women in the West were unable to obtain until 
quite recently.”49 Under the provisions of Islamic sources, women possessed “full legal 
personality” with the right to own and inherit property, as well as protections against 
infanticide, and polygamy.50 In addition, the relationship between husband and wife was 
completely reconfigured such that both parties were required to give their consent in the 
marriage contract.51 In what retrospectively constitutes a significant break from 
inherently patriarchal traditions, the Qur’an also eradicated the concept of “marriage of 
dominion,” awarding the woman full control over the dowry—control that had previously 
belonged to her father.52 One of the underlying Qur’anic prescriptions is that women no 
longer constitute objects to be bartered and purchased, implying “recognition of a degree 
of women’s autonomy and volition.”53 The Qur’an was revolutionary in not only 
reforming many of these conventions and customs that had forced women into 
submission, but also in emphasizing man and woman’s inherent egalitarianism: “It is 
[God] who hath produced you from a single person (6:98);” “We created You from a 
single (pair) Of a male and a female, And made you into Nations and tribes, that Ye may 
know each other (49:13).”
 22
Despite this nearly pervasive theme of egalitarianism, the Qu’ran does not always 
explicitly confer identical rights upon men and women. With regard to inheritance, for 
instance, the Qur’an decrees: “For men shall be a share in what their parents and kindred 
leave and for women shall be a share in what their parents and kindred leave… the male 
shall have the equal of the shares of two females…” (4:7-12). Religious scholar Shaheen 
Sarder Ali reconciles this seemingly paradoxical juxtaposition with a reference to the 
Qur’an’s inherent sense of gradualism, stating his opinion that Islam’s “hierarchical 
structure [at] the basis of relations between men and women” was merely a construct of 
its historical context.54 As previously elucidated, women were not privy to any rights of 
inheritance at all during the Jahaliyyah. Even though the Qur’an may not have 
completely altered these realities, it did take the first steps toward change when it offered 
women any share of inheritance, no matter how imbalanced in comparison to that of men.  
Ali continues: “[The Qur’an] also preached, in its ethical voice… the moral and spiritual 
equality of all human beings. Arguably, therefore, even as it instituted a sexual hierarchy, 
it laid the ground, in its ethical voice, for the subversion of the hierarchy.”55 Indeed, the 
Qur’an’s specific prescriptions were imparted to the Prophet amidst specified conditions 
and should thus develop and modify themselves as circumstances change and evolve.  
 
The process of individual human interpretation, known within Islamic discourse as 
ijtihad, was exercised vigorously, continually and without controversy among legal 
scholars in the initial years after Islam’s inception. Combined with the Qur’an’s intrinsic 
gradualism, this process of persistent interpretation provides one of the most promising 
avenues for establishing gender equality within the Muslim world.56 Around the tenth 
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century CE, however, “a consensus gradually established itself that from then onwards, 
no one could be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent reasoning in 
religious law,” thereby leaving future Islamic legal discourse to be determined on the 
basis of these somewhat antiquated decisions.57 This decision to close the “gates of 
ijtihad” developed in the face of society’s continual progress and expansion, constituting 
an effort to try to protect traditional societal mores and ensure legal continuity amidst the 
growing independence of “regional powers.”58 Once the persistent interpretation and 
adaptation of Islamic law that had so characterized the formative years following the 
Prophet Muhammad’s death was brought to a halt, the capacity for shari’ah’s 
development in the face of changing circumstances was made immensely more difficult.  
Consequently, ijtihad’s cessation as a legal process has been extremely problematic with 
regard to women’s rights in Islamic law, leaving women’s status as it was 
institutionalized in the tenth century. 
 
In stark contrast to their dramatic improvement in status with the advent of Islam, women 
witnessed a regression in treatment in the years following the Prophet’s death. The 
“egalitarian message of early Islam was conveniently forgotten” as the male-dominated 
field of Islamic jurisprudence became institutionalized amidst a predominantly 
patriarchal cultural context.59 Prevailing notions of male superiority that already were 
rampant within the traditional tribal lifestyles of many Arabs at the time were 
compounded by similar patriarchal attitudes within regions such as the Persian and 
Byzantine Empires that were conquered early on in the time of Islamic expansion.60 As a 
result, jurists interpreted basic Islamic principles in accordance with their own biases 
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toward women at the time—interpretations that eventually became entrenched within the 
four schools of Sunni law.61  
 
Patriarchal juristic tendencies, however, were not the only factors affecting the 
degradation in women’s rights in the years following the Prophet’s death. In the modern 
era, European colonialism and the associated local backlash against encroachment on 
tradition had a significant impact on prevailing societal views toward women. Local 
religious and political leaders attempted to maintain a semblance of normalcy in any way 
possible, a desire that often resulted in a drastic tightening of control over the one area 
that foreigners cannot touch—that of private home life.62 This trend is similar to that 
witnessed today in a country such as Iraq, where those under threat are inclined to cling 
intensely to traditions like hijab as a means of maintaining their identity. 
 
When legally-sanctioned ijtihad came to a halt in the tenth century, Islamic shari’ah had 
already grown to encompass the prevailing derogatory attitudes toward women and the 
collection of discriminatory practices that came along with such opinions.  Women were 
deemed subservient within the family and faced limitations with regard to areas such as 
child custody and divorce.63 More conservative interpretations and rulings also occurred 
in areas pertaining to women’s roles in society, particularly in areas such as education, 
the workforce, and politics, on which the Qur’an is more ambiguous. Without explicit 
textual guidance, provisions prohibiting women from employment outside the home, 
participation in government or elections, and even at times educational opportunities 
managed to find their way into shari’ah law.64  
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It is somewhat ironic that shari’ah—a legal system supposedly grounded in Islamic 
principles—strays quite far at times from the true attitudes and prescriptions of the 
Qur’an and Prophetic examples with regard to women. It is, of course, worth 
acknowledging that shari’ah is not at all entirely misogynistic and indeed 
institutionalizes some of the revolutionary protections women were granted in the 
Qur’an, such as the rights to dowry, initiate divorce, inherit property, and to offer consent 
for marriage. The primary issue at hand is two-fold: not only are many Muslim women 
unaware of the full extent of their protections under Islamic law, but there also exists 
enough legal ambiguity at times so as to allow for the more conservative religious clerics 
and leaders to enforce their more patriarchal interpretations of Islam. 
 
Gender Equality in Islam 
 
One of the most frequently-cited Qur’anic verses relevant to man and woman’s creation 
is verse 4:1, which reads:  
O mankind! reverence your Guardian-Lord, who created you (human plural) from 
a single person (nafs), created, of (min)  like nature, His mate (zawj), and from 
(min) them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women.65 
 
 
Despite some male jurists’ blatantly misogynistic interpretations of the above verse, a 
closer reading of this passage and others like it reveals a more egalitarian version of 
creation, apparent through the language and content itself. This version of creation is 
largely devoid of gendered conceptions or hierarchy and instead offers a robust argument 
in support of gender equality within Islam. 
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As a means of framing contextual comprehension, Amina Wadud offers a brief 
description of the term ‘ayah’ (plural, ayat)—a term that is used quite frequently 
throughout the Qur’an.66 Most commonly translated as ‘a sign,’ the word is used 
dualistically to refer to implicit ayat and explicit ayat, both of which are meant to portray 
a meaning beyond superficial definitions. Implicit ayat refer predominantly to “empirical 
signs which can be perceived by humankind;” in other words, natural phenomena that 
“reflect the presence of Allah” on earth.67 The changing seasons, the growth of a flower, 
or the birth of a child can all be described as implicit (or non-linguistic) ayat. Explicit 
ayat, on the other hand, are linguistically symbolically significant, overtly meant to 
convey “specific information about the realm of the Unseen world”.68  
 
Unlike implicit ayat which refer to tangible earthly occurrences, explicit ayat are “verbal 
symbols,” ones which—by their very nature—are only capable of being exposed through 
the word of God as revealed through Muhammad and are thus “irrevocably linked with 
creation.”69 From this dualistic understanding of ayat come two possible interpretive 
strategies: one that follows historical precedent with a strictly grammatical and 
conceptual analysis of the Qur’anic words, and another that examines the indexicality70 
of words as a symbolic meaning entirely divorced from grammatical, syntactical, or 
semantic characteristics.71 In an effort to offer more straightforward arguments that could 
conceivably be implemented as part of an Iraqi reconstructive policy, this analysis 
follows the traditional approach with respect to grammar and context in offering a 
rebuttal to past misogynistic analyses of creation.  
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Aside from the term ‘ayat,’ the preposition ‘min,’ utilized in the Arabic language to mean 
either ‘from’ (as in, “the extraction of a thing from [an]other”) or ‘of the same nature as,’ 
appears a number of times in verse 4:1.72 Depending on how each translation is ascribed 
to the aforementioned verse, it conveys drastically different meanings regarding man and 
woman’s equality. If, as in scholar al-Zamakshari’s interpretation, the ‘extraction’ 
definition is applied, the verse would read as follows: man was created “in/of the same 
type as a single nafs, and that the zawj of that nafs was taken from that nafs”.73 As such, 
woman is deemed to have been extracted from man.  
 
This notion of extraction is supposedly corroborated with additional verses (Wadud cites 
7:189 and 39:6) that convey similar ideas but utilize the term ‘ja’ala’ (‘to create 
something from another thing’) in the place of ‘khalaqa’ (‘to create’).  Nevertheless, the 
definition of ‘ja’ala,’ is far from clear-cut. The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written 
Arabic provides almost twenty possible meanings of the term, none of which necessarily 
indicate the sort of extractive meaning stated above.74 Thus, the verse can be 
reinterpreted to state that woman was made ‘in the same form’ or ‘of the same nature’ as 
man, rather than coming from him.75 Though less widespread, there is another alternative 
interpretation as well that relies even more heavily on some of the linguistic 
characteristics of the verse. The Arabic term ‘nafs’ (‘person’ or ‘self’) is grammatically 
feminine, while the term ‘zawj’ (‘mate’) is grammatically masculine. As such, the verse 
could be read as suggesting that the man was actually derived from the woman (with the 
‘zawj’ being derived from the ‘nafs’).  
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It is also worth noting that neither verse 4:1 nor any of the other “30 or so passages which 
describe the creation of humanity” provide explicit grammatical indication that 
humankind was derived from Adam or any other male.76 Unlike the biblical 
representation of Adam and Eve in which Eve is created from Adam’s rib, the Qur’an is 
much more general. Many of its relevant verses reference men and women with rather 
ambiguous terminology such as ‘an-nas,’ ‘al-insan,’ and ‘bashar’: “And indeed We, 
created al-insan from an extract of clay]” (23:12); “Say: ‘I seek refuge in the Lord of an-
nas’” (114:1); “It is not for al-bashar that God should give him the Book and 
Judgment…” (3:79). Though each of these terms does have ‘man’ as one of its 
translations, Hans Wehr also offers many other alternative definitions that are less 
specific. In their most common usages, ‘an-nas’ can mean ‘people’ or ‘folk’; ‘al-insan’ 
can mean ‘human being,’ ‘someone,’ ‘somebody,’ ‘one,’ or ‘a person’; and ‘bashar’ can 
mean ‘human being’ or ‘mankind.’77 There are still other verses pertaining to creation 
that refer to men and women more informally, addressing humanity using the pronoun ‘-
kum,’ which refers to the pluralized ‘you’: “He it is Who Created you(-kum) of clay” 
(6:2). Speaking directly to the people as opposed to about them only further divorces 
Qur’anic proclamations of creation from gendered readings.  
 
Importantly, Arabic nouns necessarily require either a masculine or a feminine 
grammatical gender. Still, as Wadud argues, “it does not follow that each use of 
masculine or feminine persons is necessarily restricted to the mentioned gender”.78 For 
one thing, Eve’s name is never unequivocally stated in the Qur’an [she is referred to only 
as “The Wife of the Prophet Adam”].79 Although Adam is frequently referenced by 
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name, the wider occurrence of his name does not inevitably translate into a preference for 
the male. Indeed, this manner of referring to women was, at the time, a sign of respect.80  
Moreover, aside from its assumed reference to the man itself, the word ‘Adam’ is actually 
derived from the Hebrew word ‘adamah’ or ‘soil.’ As Riffat Hassan describes, “in 
Hebrew the term ‘Adam’ functions generally as a collective noun referring to ‘the 
human’ rather than to a male human being…In the Qur’an, the term ‘Adam’ refers, in 
twenty-one cases out of twenty-five, to humanity”.81 Thus, the use of ‘Adam’ can be both 
a reference to the actual male figure, or to a universal portrayal of human creation.  
 
To more vividly illustrate these ideas of a genderless depiction of creation, one must first 
understand a key function of the Arabic language itself: the potential dichotomy between 
grammatical and conceptual genders. All Arabic nouns possess a gender, including 
inanimate objects like the masculine ‘house’ (‘al-bayt’) and the feminine ‘car’ (‘al-
sayyaarah’) that are very clearly devoid of gender on anything more than a linguistic 
level. This principle is reflected quite clearly in verse 4:1 after an examination of the 
terms ‘nafs’ and ‘zawj.’ ‘Nafs,’ as defined by Hans Wehr, refers to the ‘self,’ one’s 
‘personal identity,’ or a ‘human being’.82 As used in Arabic, the term takes a feminine 
gender with “corresponding feminine adjectival and verbal antecedents”—a grammatical 
construct that in no way conceptually necessitates reference to a specific human gender.83  
Although the later Sufi sects saw the term as a reference toward the soul as an entirely 
separate substance, Fazlur Rahman emphasizes that this definition was not the intention 
in the Qur’an [“The Qur’an itself does not endorse mind-body or body-soul dualisms”].84 
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Therefore, despite its feminine grammatical construct, ‘nafs’ is a conceptually-implied 
neuter—a reference only to the ‘Self,’ with gender left largely ambiguous.85  
 
The term ‘zawj’ is also rather dubious. While grammatically masculine (taking the 
associated masculine adjectival and verbal constructions), the actual definition of the 
word yields much greater ambiguity with regard to specific gendered implications. Hans 
Wehr provides an array of definitions, including ‘one of a pair;’ ‘husband;’ ‘wife;’ 
‘mate;’ and ‘couple’.86 Clearly, this range of meanings implies a number of possible 
interpretations, the vast majority of which do not specify a particular gender and instead 
refer more generically to either member of a couple. Moreover, as Wadud mentions, 
‘zawj’ is conceptually used throughout the Qur’an to refer to not only men and women 
but also to non-gendered things such as “plants [55:52]87 and animals [11:40]”.88 
Creation itself is framed around the emergence of pairs, two parts derived from the same 
nafs (Self): “And of all things We have created (zawjayn) pairs. Perhaps you [will all] 
reflect [on this fact]” (51:49); “…It is stirred (to life) and swelleth up and produceth 
every kind of attractive herbage (in pairs)” (22:7); “And We created you (plural) in 
pairs” (78:8).  
 
Other verses expound upon these ideas, emphasizing both the inherent dualism and 
egalitarianism associated with creation: “It is [God] Who created You from a single 
person/And made [its] mate of like nature…;”89 “We created You from a single (pair) Of 
a male and a female.”90 There is, however, a verse that some interpret as a subversion of 
these equitable principles.  It states: “By the Night as it/Conceals (the light);/By the Day 
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as it/Appears in glory;/By (the mystery of)/The creation of male/And female;-/Verily, 
(the ends) ye/Strive for are diverse”.91 Night and day, some argue, constitute a binary 
opposition that is linguistically juxtaposed against “male and female” in this verse. Still, 
these contrasting images are not meant to hierarchically preference day over night or man 
over woman, indicated “not only from the totality of the Qur’an’s teachings but also from 
the Ayat quoted above in which the first half of the dyad is not privileged over the 
second”.92 The Qur’anic conceptualization of man and woman as zawjayn is thereby one 
of two distinctive yet entirely congruent components of one ‘Self,’ one nafs—components 
that are in fact dependent on each other.  Indeed, each element exists only in reference to 
its counterpart; without a wife, one cannot be a husband and without light, one cannot 
have dark. These ideas lend further credence to the Qur’an’s underlying message of 
egalitarianism and the mutually beneficial relationship between man and woman.   
 
The dichotomy between the grammatical gender of key terms such as ‘nafs’ and ‘zawj’ 
and the ideas to which they refer in verse 4:1 and others dealing with creation reveal that 
specified gender exists only to the extent that the Arabic language necessitates it. Any 
linguistic analysis of the words of revelation demands that one reach beyond proscribed 
grammar.  Framed by the dualism of both implicit and explicit ayat, the nature of the 
Qur’an as a set of lexical and syntactical constructions is such that a word’s grammatical 
gender does not unilaterally translate into an identical conceptual one. The result is a 
penumbra of linguistic ambiguity with regard to gender in the Qur’anic creation verses, 
an ambiguity that is manifested in the multitude of relevant tafsir (interpretations). Most 
early religious scholars, operating within a patriarchal cultural framework, ascribed 
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grammatical gender to the creation verses so as to imply male superiority.93 Still, this 
ambiguity can feasibly be analyzed with a more egalitarian outlook. Hassan even goes as 
far as to say that the Qur’an “could be interpreted as stating that the first creation was 
feminine, not masculine!”94 A brief examination of the Arabic pronouns in verse 4:1 
confirms the plausibility of Hassan’s hypothesis.  
 
With emphasis added for reference, the verse reads as follows: “Wa min ayatihi an 
khalaqa-kum min nafsin wahidatin wa khalaqa min-ha zawjaha wa baththa minhuma 
rijalan kathiran wa nisa’an”.95 In Arabic, the pronoun ‘-ha’ is attached to the end of a 
noun to indicate possession, with its English parallel being the feminine pronoun 
meaning either “her” or “its” (provided the non-human noun is grammatically female). 
‘Nafs,’ while grammatically female, is conceptually used throughout the Qur’an in a 
more neutered fashion, acquiring a symbolic meaning in the purely linguistic dimension 
of ayat. As such, there is nothing in the Arabic itself to specify the term’s usage in this 
verse as referentially male, female, or neuter. Since it is just as feasible that the usage of 
‘nafs’ in this verse is conceptually female, Hassan’s hypothesis can draw upon linguistic 
evidence. If ‘nafs’ is interpreted as a conceptually female ‘Self,’ the successive ‘-ha’ 
pronouns would reference the noun accordingly and the rest of the sentence would 
translate as: “And from his signs… He created You (mankind) from a single female Self 
and created from her [her] spouse...” In accordance with Hassan’s premise, man can 
thus be interpreted as having been created from the female ‘Self.’96  
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Notwithstanding the legitimacy of Hassan’s argument, just because something is 
linguistically conceivable does not mean it is an accepted interpretation. In the absence of 
God’s explication of these revelations, humanity is left to its own devices when it comes 
to interpreting God’s intentions. The details, however, are conspicuous by their absence 
in the Qur’an; accordingly, there is evidence to suggest that the absence of such 
descriptive language is perhaps just as significant as those words that are explicitly stated. 
The most striking consequence of these omissions is the lack of a grammatically or 
conceptually gendered portrayal of creation.  
 
In fact, the lack of detail with regard to the creation story led many early mufassirun 
(those who perform exegesis) to turn to the Bible for assistance in filling in these 
seemingly essential gaps. Just as biblical details such as Eve’s derivation from Adam’s 
rib have been mistakenly attributed to the Qur’an, so, too are there portrayals of the 
Garden story that are entirely inaccurate according to Islamic sources. Though the vast 
majority of these traditional interpretations place predominant blame for the Fall of 
mankind on the woman, they do differ according to the specific details. Al-Tabari, a well-
known mufasir (one who performs exegesis) from the tenth century, cites Adam and his 
wife’s contrasting moral and physical characteristics as evidence of woman’s “weakness 
and guile.” Other interpretations refer to woman’s alluring “sexual desire” as that which 
was able to overshadow Adam’s prudence. Still more traditions state that Satan directly 
tempted Hawwa’, who then cunningly persuaded Adam to join her in eating from the 
tree.97 Even the word Hawwa’—the Arabic name for Eve that actually never appears in 
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the Qur’an itself—is connected to a tradition that comes from the Christian Bible in 
which “its meaning is likewise defined in relation to the man’s body.”98  
 
As previously shown, however, the Qur’anic description of Creation in no way indicates 
that woman and man are anything but equal, and there is even an alternative 
interpretation (though unpersuasive to most) to suggest that woman may have preceded 
man. Similarly, the Qur’an’s version of the Garden story never confers blame on the 
woman; in fact, blame is either equally distributed or solely imparted to Adam. The 
overarching thematic emphasis of the Garden story, however, divorces itself almost 
entirely from gender, highlighting not the inherent capacity for sin in both men and 
women, but instead, the broader idea about “[humankind’s] purpose on earth and ways of 
God’s guidance.”99 
 
When taken together as a whole, the various Qur’anic suras (chapters) tell a story similar 
at least in basic premise to that of the Old Testament. Iblis (Satan) refuses to prostrate to 
Adam, challenges God, and is thereby framed as an “enemy” to mankind (7:22; 20:116; 
15:30-33; 38:73-76; 7:11-12; 12:5).100 Adam and his wife, meanwhile, are called upon to 
“dwell…in the garden,” permitted to “eat from wherever you [two] desire, but go not 
near this tree for then you [two] will be of the unjust.”101 Tempted by Iblis, man and 
woman disobey God’s words and eat the forbidden fruit. Having demonstrated mankind’s 
capacity for error, man and woman repent and are forgiven: “[Allah] said: ‘Get you 
down. With enmity between yourselves. On earth will be your dwelling-place and your 
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means of livelihood-for a time. Therein shall you live, and therein shall you die, and from 
it shall you be raised.”  (7:21; 7:23-25; 2:36-38).102  
 
Despite these similarities to the biblical Garden story, a deeper analysis of the relevant 
suras—particularly Suras 7, 20 and 2—strongly debunks any traditional readings that 
attribute primary blame to the woman.  The Qur’anic version of the Garden story is, like 
the rest of the text, not arranged chronologically. The narrative is dispersed throughout a 
number of suras with each one differing “as to focus, sequencing of events, and the 
involvement of the woman.”103 There are two relevant analyses that follow from this sort 
of an organization, both of which are helpful in confirming man and woman’s equality 
and framing the broader message of the Garden story.  
 
First, in examining the language of the suras pertaining to the temptation, the Qur’an 
“always uses the Arabic dual” construction ‘-huma’ in its references to man and woman. 
This conjugation helps to abstract the importance of gender in analyzing the implications 
of the Garden story, instead placing emphasis on Adam and his wife’s actions as a unit, 
not as individuals. Importantly, Sura 20—the earliest chronologically with regard to this 
story—marks the “one exception to the Qur’anic use of the dual form to refer to the 
temptation and disobedience”: 
And indeed had We covenanted unto Adam before, but he forgot; but We did not 
find in him any intention (to disobey Us)…But Satan whispered unto him saying: 
‘O’ Adam! Shall I guide thee unto the tree of eternity and unto a kingdom which 
decayeth not?’ Then they both ate of it… And Adam acted not (to the advices of) 
his Lord (deceived by Satan) and got astray… (20:115-121) 
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Here, it is Adam upon whom the emphasis is placed. Even though both he and his wife 
partake in the fruit, the word ‘adam’ is the one cited with regard to disobedience. It is in 
this way that blame is perhaps attributed to man. A more persuasive explanation, 
however, is that this sura represents one of the many times in which ‘adam’ is used to 
refer to humanity as a collective—a further illustrative piece of evidence for man and 
woman’s equality, both in capacity for culpability and for forgiveness.   
 
The second analysis, relying on order of revelation, reveals a trend that suggests that 
gender may not be an overly critical component of the Garden story at all. Placed in 
chronological context, the relevant suras offer an evolution of the Garden story that 
“proce[eeds] from a focus on Adam (Sura 20) to one involving both Adam and his wife 
(Sura 7), [with] the final version…transcend[ing] both by way of introducing” themes 
which are universally applicable, namely those of forgiveness and “spiritual well-being” 
for those who follow God’s direction. Men and women are equally susceptible to 
temptation, but this reality is not an indication of any inherent evil within humanity. 
Islam, unlike Christianity, does not preach any concept of original sin; even though 
people will inevitably stray from God’s guidance at times, they will be forgiven as long 
as they recognize their errors and repent. Here, specific gender is rendered largely 
inconsequential in the presence of this more universal message.  
 
There is a compelling linguistic argument in support of this egalitarian message as well. 
Though there are six different words for ‘garden’ in Arabic, each sura pertaining to the 
Garden story uses the word ‘juna’—a word that can also be translated as ‘obsession; 
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madness; insanity’ as well as ‘protection, shelter, shield.’104 These shared meanings 
reinforce the notion that despite men and women’s unavoidable madness at times, God 
will still protect them and shield them from overall harm. Men and women’s roles as 
corporeal beings in the story allow God’s guiding principles to be made more tangible. 
As Amina Wadud states, “The female and male characters are particularly important to 
demonstrate certain ideas about guidance. The characters and events in the Qur’an should 
always be examined in the light of this overall goal.”105  As such, the Garden story is not 
meant to delineate specific gender roles or individual characteristics, but instead to 
convey a broader message with regard to men and women’s shared capacity for 
forgiveness, provided they repent to God and follow the straight path.  
 
Marriage 
 
Notwithstanding the necessity of understanding man and woman’s inherent equality in 
the Qur’an, these general egalitarian principles can only go so far in countering violence 
against women, particularly when such violence directly targets specific legal areas. 
Although women in many Muslim countries do face legal challenges in a number of 
areas, they are often particularly restricted when it comes to family law or personal status 
law, which pertains to matters relevant to the relationship between husband and wife such 
as marriage and divorce. The more conservative personal status laws often rely quite 
heavily on supposed Islamic justifications in favor of women’s circumscribed rights 
within the home. A closer look at the Qur’an as a whole and examples from the Prophet 
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Muhammad’s life, however, reveal an alternatively compelling argument in favor of 
women’s intended freedom in matters of personal status.  
 
Prior to Islam’s development, there existed over ten forms of marriage (permanent, Nikah 
al-Zainaab, Zawaj-al-Badal, Nika al-Dayzan, etc.), nearly all of which disregarded 
women’s opinions or rights as a human being. While Islam did still permit a master to 
marry his slave, nearly all of the other forms of marriage were abolished as the Prophet 
delegitimized all but “marriage by contract.”106 Rather than constituting the object to be 
contracted, women became a “principal transacting part[y]” in marriage, valued just as 
much as the husband.107 One of the most tangible manifestations of this shift in status is 
that, for the first time, “Islamic law recognized the wife—not her father—to be the 
recipient of the brideprice,” traditionally referred to as the dowry.108 Within the Qur’an, 
women are declared to be the “twin halves of men,” and are forbidden to be forced into 
marriage.109 Although a male guardian’s permission is required under certain schools of 
Islamic law,110 marriage cannot take place without both the husband and wife’s consent 
as well: “A previously married woman shall not be married till she gives her consent nor 
should a virgin be married till her consent is sought.”111  
 
If a woman is forced into matrimony against her will or is not satisfied with her situation, 
the issue can be brought to court. The hadith provide a useful example in the story of 
“Khansa’ bint Khidam al-Ansariyya [when her] father married her to someone when she 
was a woman who had already been married. She did not like this state of affairs, so she 
went to the Prophet and he revoked the marriage contract for her.”112 In this way, 
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although the man remains the symbolic head of the household, the woman is given new 
abilities to interfere should he misuse his power.113 Complete and utter reform could not 
occur automatically or all at once, but this development set a precedent for women’s 
gradual augmentation in power and status within marriage.  
 
Islam’s inherent gradualism is also quite apparent through an examination of the practice 
of polygamy. Although the Qur’an does not expressly forbid the practice, it did institute a 
number of restrictions that, at the time, marked a dramatic shift in the treatment of 
women. Not only does the Qur’an limit the number of wives to four, but it also clearly 
states that a man must be able to treat each of his wives fairly:  
And if you fear that you cannot act equitably towards orphans, then marry such 
women as seem good to you, two and three and four; but if you fear that you will 
not do justice (between them), then (marry) only one or what your right hands 
possess; this is more proper, that you may not deviate from the right course. 
(4:3)114 
 
This verse severely hindered much of the rampant marriage and subsequent disparaging 
treatment of women that had previously occurred. Qur’anic opinion of polygamy takes on 
an even more liberal meaning when this verse is considered in tandem with verse 4:129: 
“You are never able to be fair and just between women, even if it is your ardent 
desire.”115 Taken together, verses 4:3 and 4:129 imply the impossibility of exercising 
polygamy and equitable treatment of all wives simultaneously and some “theologians 
opine that… therefore, polygamy is as good as banned.”116 Such an interpretation 
acknowledges the Qur’an’s intrinsic gradualism. Progress does not occur overnight; a 
blatant forbiddance of polygamy would have been too radical a change after centuries of 
its permissibility. Moreover, polygamy was viewed as a humanitarian way to help 
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orphaned widows find stability and support in an environment where single women did 
not fare well. Accordingly, the Qur’an is constructed in such a way that its verses imply a 
need for constant development over time. Restrictions limiting the number of wives and 
requiring equitable treatment were effective immediately, but, according to moderate 
interpretations, these stipulations were also meant to continually evolve over time.  
   
The specific historical context of the revelations relating to polygamy shed further light 
on the situation, suggesting that polygamy may have only been advised under specified 
circumstances. The Qur’anic verses that permit men to take up to four wives were 
revealed following the devastating Battle of Uhud in the year 625, a battle that quite 
literally decimated the population of Muslim men. Countless women and young girls 
were left widows and orphans, forced to fend for themselves in a society that still largely 
favored men.117 Many Qur’anic commentators highlight the importance of these atypical 
circumstances when analyzing the intentions of those verses discussing polygamy. Given 
the dire situation in the aftermath of the battle, Qur’anic commentators such as 
Muhammad Ali suggest that men were permitted to take more than one wife as a means 
of helping to save female victims of war from a life of destitution.118 Between verses 4:3 
and 4:129 and an understanding of historical circumstances, the Qur’an implies the near 
impossibility of acquiring a relationship that is both polygamous and fair—a reflection, 
perhaps, of the intention for an eventual full-out ban of the practice.  
 
Aside from improvements for women when entering into marriage, early Islam also 
enhanced equality within the home. Qur’anic verse 2:187 declares: “…they are (like) an 
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apparel for you and you are an apparel for them,” thereby fostering a union ground in 
mutual dependency and cohabitation.119 While the male remained the head of the 
household as was customary at the time, the Qur’an did not intend for such a relationship 
to be a dictatorship; men and women were indeed created from the same source.  
 
Profound support for the equitable status of the sexes is derived from the Prophet’s life as 
well; his example is traditionally looked to and revered by Muslims as the closest 
paradigm of perfection. His own wives Khadija and Aisha were extremely strong figures 
in the development and promulgation of the Islamic community, with Aisha even playing 
a role on the battlefield.120 More specifically pertaining to household affairs, there is a 
hadith that reads as follows: “I asked Aisha: ‘What did the Prophet use to do about the 
house?’ She answered: ‘He would do chores for his family and then, whenever he heard 
the call for prayer, he would go out to pray.’”121  
 
Despite his prescribed hierarchical role as caretaker, the Prophet recognized the 
limitations of this status and saw no need to exercise absolute authority over every aspect 
of the home. Instead, he split the burden and took part in practices often stereotypically 
assigned to the female, “help[ing] women with housework and mend[ing] his own 
clothes.”122 The Prophet’s approach to family matters was quite monumental and 
revealing given the hierarchical way in which household roles were eventually 
reinterpreted to imply male dominion. Moreover, shared domestic responsibilities marked 
yet another demonstration of woman’s dramatic and transformative shift from chattel to 
person after the advent of Islam.  
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Despite these overwhelmingly positive points, there are two Qur’anic verses that can be 
(and often are) construed as misogynistic. The first of these, verse 4:34, is frequently 
upheld in support of both women’s subservience and physical abuse against the wife.  
Nevertheless, like many of the words in the verses surrounding the Creation story, there 
are a number of Arabic terms in 4:34 whose implications change drastically depending on 
interpretation. Leaving the questionable terms in Arabic for the time being, the verse 
reads as follows: 
Men are qawwumun ‘ala women on account of the qualities with which Allah 
hath preferred (faddala) some of them to excel over the others and for what they 
spend of their property; therefore the righteous women are qanitat, guarding the 
unseen that which God hath guarded; and as to those whose perverseness ye fear 
nushuz, admonish them and avoid them in beds and adriboo them; and if they 
obey you, then seek not a way against them. (4:34)123 
 
 
By one conservative interpretation of each of these words, this verse can be taken to 
mean that men are superior (qawwumun) over women. In addition, God’s preference 
(faddala) for the male over the female thereby renders women entirely submissive 
(qanitat). Finally, the husband is permitted to beat (adriboo) his wife upon being made 
aware of her misconduct (nushuz). Still, this reading of verse 4:34 is rather 
circumscribed; each of the words ‘qawwumun,’ ‘faddala,’ ‘qanitat,’ ‘nushuz,’ and 
‘adriboo’ possesses a host of potential interpretations, many of which convey a 
significantly more progressive and egalitarian vision of women.  
 
‘Qawwum’ (the singular form of ‘qawwumun’) comes from the root ‘qam,’ whose most 
relevant translations are either ‘to be in charge of, to guard’ or ‘to take care of, to attend 
to.’124 As such, before even examining the noun form of this root, it is apparent that the 
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beginning of verse 4:34 has two very different potential meanings: one implying that men 
assume full control over women and the other connoting men as caretakers. The noun 
‘qawwum’ is also translated a number of ways, ranging from ‘protector’ in Yusuf Ali’s 
Qur’anic translation to ‘authority’ in Ahmed Ali’s translation. Hans Wehr defines the 
term and some of those closely-related in terms of spelling and pronunciation as either 
‘fellow tribesmen, kinsfolk, kindred (‘qaum’),’ ‘caretaker, custodian (qayyim),’ or 
‘guardian, caretaker, keeper (qawwaam).’125 Assuming that any of these translations is 
possible, the verse could be interpreted as suggesting that men and women are kin, men 
are in charge of women, or men should care for women. Still, out of the three terms 
translated above in Hans Wehr, the final—‘qawwaam’—is most similar in spelling to that 
written in the Qur’an. Even a focus solely on this word, however, leaves one with some 
ambiguity as to exactly what the Qur’an is implying about its characterization of men in 
relation to women.  
 
Recent scholars such as Amina Wadud, Azizah al-Hibri, and Riffat Hassan, echoing 
some older exegesis, read the term ‘qawwamun’ as an implication that men must provide 
financial support for their wives. Translating the term as ‘breadwinners,’ these analyses 
are quick to point out that the husband’s economic responsibilities do not necessarily 
translate into fewer rights for women. While uncommon, some women did greatly excel 
at achieving economic prowess long before such opportunities became more culturally 
entrenched. The Prophet Muhammad’s own first wife, Khadija, was in charge of a 
business and possessed wealth that far exceeded the means of the Prophet at their time of 
marriage.126  Here, there is a notable difference between Qur’anic expectation for women 
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and explicit obligation. Just because women are not specifically mentioned as the 
financially-responsible party does not mean that they are in any way forbidden from 
supporting themselves or deemed subsidiary to men. Certainly this was not the case with 
the Prophet’s own wife, Khadija.  
 
In fact, taken in the historical context, such an analysis becomes coherent and 
meaningful. At the time of revelation, women had not yet had the opportunity to provide 
for themselves or maintain a household. Men had to take care of women by virtue of 
necessity, not out of an inherent hierarchical difference. Rahman declares this dependent 
role to be “purely functional…such dependence is no longer necessarily true, and thus, in 
a new sharia, male guardianship over women should be terminated,” for women have 
gradually grown to possess more opportunity for economic freedom and protection.127 
Islamic scholar Muhammad Abduh provides further support for this premise, stating that 
the laws pertaining to religious duties (ibadat) “by nature lie beyond interpretive change, 
[but] the laws on social transactions (muamalat) by nature require interpretation and 
adaptation by each generation of Muslims in light of the practical needs of their age.”128 
Taken as such, man’s role as caretaker of women should be readjusted with 
modernization and women’s ever-enhancing capacity for self-sufficiency.  
 
Whether or not one chooses to uphold this more economic reading of ‘qawwamun,’ it is 
worth noting that, either way, the verse still does not unilaterally favor men over women. 
The verse “does not read ‘they (masculine plural) are preferred over them (feminine 
plural).’” Instead, it reads ‘ba’d-hum (some of them [plural encompassing both male and 
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female genders]) are preferred over ba’d  (others)’ As such, the verse merely points out a 
rather obvious reality of existence, namely that people are not equal in all areas: “Some 
men excel over some women in some manners. Likewise, some women excel over some 
men in some manners.” Furthermore, the term ‘qanitat’ (‘submission’ or ‘obedience’) is 
commonly read as implying women’s subservience to men. Nevertheless, a consideration 
of this term as it is used throughout the Qur’an reveals its association with both women129 
and men.130 In this context, ‘qanitat’ refers to spiritual submission to God—the general 
prostration of all humans before God and not the prostration of one human before 
another.  
 
‘Nushuz,’ coming from the root meaning ‘to be recalcitrant or disobedient,’ is typically 
translated as ‘recalcitrance of the woman toward her husband.’ According to Hans Wehr, 
however, ‘nushuz’ has a variety of other definitions including ‘animosity, hostility,’ 
‘dissonance, discord,’ and, perhaps most notably, ‘violation of marital duties on the part 
of either husband or wife, specif. recalcitrance of woman toward her husband and brutal 
treatment of the wife by the husband.’131 In this verse, therefore, ‘nushuz’ could imply 
anything from a woman’s specific misconduct to general marital discord or discontent. 
Given the term’s usage in its other context in the Qur’an, the latter definition is much 
more likely: “And if a woman feareth from her husband nushuz…” (4:128). Even though 
the same term is used in both verses, conservative exegesis frequently chooses a different 
translation for each, with the one in verse 4:34 implying a woman’s ‘disobedience to her 
husband.’132 Still, this dichotomy between meanings does not make sense; the term 
“cannot mean ‘disobedience to the husband’” as it is used to refer to the conduct of both 
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husband and wife. As such, verse 4:34 likely connotes a mutual “state of disorder 
between the married couple” and not one of a woman’s disobedience to her 
hierarchically-superior husband.133  
 
In any case, the final portion of verse 4:34 outlines what should occur in the event of 
‘nushuz,’ whether female misconduct or general discord. The verse first suggests a verbal 
attempt at reconciliation, followed by a physical separation (“…admonish them, avoid 
them in beds…”). If all else fails, men are then permitted to ‘adriboo’ their wives, a term 
commonly translated as ‘to beat’ and thereby justifying the husband’s physical violence 
against his wife. This word comes from the root ‘daraba,’ which, in addition to meaning 
‘to beat, strike, hit,’ also means ‘to turn away from, leave, avoid,’ ‘to set an example,’ 
and ‘to set apart.’134 The verse could just as easily be interpreted as permitting the 
husband to ignore or leave his wife if their problems do not improve.   
 
Regardless of either choice of interpretation, this verse is still a positive step away from 
the rampant abuses against women that took place throughout the Jahiliyya. Wadud 
points out that the use of the word ‘daraba’ as opposed to its related term ‘darraba,’ or 
‘to strike repeatedly or intensely,’ indicates a prescriptive mitigation of “unchecked 
violence against females. Thus, this is not permission, but a severe restriction of existing 
practices.”135 Just as the Qur’an has imbued within it the expectation of gradual reform 
over time in areas such as polygamy, so, too, does verse 4:34 perhaps put into effect the 
first steps toward complete eradication of even the possibility of a husband doling out a 
physical blow.  
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The second controversial verse is Sura 2:228, which states: “And [(the rights) due to the 
women are similar to (the rights) against them, (or responsibilities they owe) with regard 
to] the ma’ruf, and men have a degree [darajah] above them (feminine plural).”136 Often 
interpreted as implying man’s inherent hierarchical preference over woman in all 
circumstances, the sura is actually much more ambiguous when considered in relation to 
other Qur’anic verses or within its historical context. According to the Concordance on 
Oxford Islamic Studies Online, the word ‘darajah’ appears in 17 verses throughout the 
Qur’an. Other examples include Sura 58:11 which states, “Allah will exalt those who 
believe among you, and those who have knowledge, to high darajat;” Sura 3:162-163 
which states, “Is then he who abideth by the pleasure of God, like him who hath brought 
on himself the wrath from God, and whose abode shall be Hell? What an evil destination 
(it is). They are of diverse darajah with God; and verily God beholdeth what (all) they 
do;” and Sura 6:132 which reads, “And for all are darajat in accordance with what they 
do; and thy Lord is not heedless of what they do.”137  
 
Taken together, the various uses of ‘darajah’ indicate that although all people are 
generally deemed equal before God, they are distinguishable from one another along the 
lines of certain traits such as level of knowledge or, as is mentioned most frequently, 
quality of behavior and actions.  In this way, the verse that uses ‘darajah’ with regard to 
men and women was not likely intended to be applicable to more than a very 
circumscribed context, in this case, divorce. It is with regard to this issue of talaq, or 
divorce, that the circumstances of revelation are particularly valuable in explaining away 
seemingly misogynistic readings of the Qur’an. 
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Divorce 
 
The Qur’an also greatly enhanced women’s rights pertaining to the dissolution of 
marriage. Representing one of the more controversial issues within Islamic thought at 
present, divorce is much more clearly defined when it comes to Islam’s original tenets. In 
reality, many of the current human rights abuses associated with divorce stem not from 
the time of Prophet Muhammad but from the development of formalized Islamic law in 
the years following his death. While not expressly forbidden by any means, divorce is 
neither recommended nor encouraged. Still, both the Qur’an and hadith do acknowledge 
the need for some sort of mechanism of separation should irreconcilable marital conflicts 
arise. At this stage, the Qur’an advocates intercession or adjudication utilizing 
representatives from not only the husband’s side of the family, but from the wife’s as 
well: “If you fear a breach between them twain, appoint (two) arbiters, one from his 
family, and the other from hers.” (4:35)138  
 
Already awarding women more equitable treatment through this balanced arbitration, the 
Qur’an further eroded pre-Islamic misogyny in verse 2:229 which reads: “A divorce is 
only permissible twice: after that, the parties should either hold Together on equitable 
terms, or separate with kindness.”139 As advocated by the Prophet, these three divorces 
were not to occur simultaneously on the same occasion. The abusive practice of “talaq 
bid’i or talaq thalatha fi majlisin wahidin (triple divorce in one sitting) is an innovation 
introduced after the death of the Prophet Muhammad… There is no mention of the triple 
talaq in the Qur’an and Hadith.”140 Before these limitations were implemented, men 
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could repetitively divorce and remarry their wives as many times as they wanted with 
impunity—a practice that severely objectified women and left them unable to adequately 
exercise control over their lives. This unbridled means of divorce was severely reigned in 
during the time of the Prophet, as the number of permissible divorces was capped at three 
in verse 2:229. 
 
Additionally, in order to guard against rash and impetuous actions on the part of the 
husband, the Qur’an instituted the notion of ‘Iddat—a waiting period lasting the length of 
the wife’s three menstrual cycles. Only at the end of the ‘Iddat does a divorce become 
irrevocable. Verse 2:231 further expounds on ‘Iddat:  
When you divorce women, and they fulfill the term of their (iddat), either take 
them back on equitable terms or set them free on equitable terms; but do no take 
them back to injure them, (or) to take undue advantage. If anyone does that, he 
wrongs his own soul. (2:231)141 
 
If and when divorce was deemed irrevocable, the Qur’an instituted other mechanisms for 
ensuring the divorced wife’s protection and continued care. For example, men are 
obligated to pay alimony to their former wives: “For divorced women, maintenance 
(should be provided) on a reasonable (scale). This is a duty on the righteous” (2:241).142 
Moreover, the Qur’an also allotted certain circumstances in which women could instigate 
divorce as well. While still not completely equitable, the Qur’anic changes with regard to 
divorce were progressive in comparison to pre-Islamic practices.  
 
 
 
 50
The Hijab 
 
Aside from legal challenges with regard to personal status laws, some women also face 
significant restrictions on their appearance and dress. For many Muslim women, the 
decision to wear the hijab is purely a personal choice—an expression of individual faith, 
modesty, or security. Too often, however, conservative clerics or leaders exploit the hijab 
as a mechanism for imposing more misogynistic or traditional gender roles by mandating 
that all women remain covered, in some instances fully covered (head, body and face). In 
Iraq today, many women are confronted with the omnipresent threat of violence from 
Islamist militias if they do not don the appropriate clothing. The hijab became twisted 
and manipulated over time, representing male dominion over women and tangibly 
signifying a group of women who were in desperate need of liberation from the West.143 
Nevertheless, as Asma Barlas elucidates, the hijab’s symbolic manifestation as an object 
of female subjugation possesses no Qur’anic basis whatsoever, despite conservatives’ 
arguments to the contrary. Rather than ordaining that women be fully covered or entirely 
secluded, the Qur’an instead promotes modesty, privacy, and—perhaps ironically given 
many arguments to the contrary—security from sexual abuse.144  As a result of the 
intricate intersection of patriarchal interpretations and disregard for the asbab al-nuzul, 
the veil has undergone both a semantic and cultural shift, emerging from Qur’anic verses 
33:53-55, 33:59-60, and 24:30-31 as a “misplaced symbol” of women’s oppression and 
societal isolation.  
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While ‘hijab’ is defined as the traditional veil by one translation, the term can also refer 
to a physical barrier such as a curtain, screen, or partition. In fact, nearly every instance in 
which the Qur’an uses the term refers to some sort of barrier, be it a physical partition 
within the home or a metaphorical separation between believers and nonbelievers.145 On 
a purely linguistic level, there is consequently no obvious indication that the Qur’an ever 
intended to prescribe a certain way of dress for women. Beyond the specific word choices 
and grammatical constructions of relevant verses, the historical context of revelation is 
also applicable when considering verse 33:53-55, which reads: 
O believers, enter not the houses of the Prophet, except leave is given you for a 
meal, without watching for its hour. But when you are invited, then enter and 
when you have had the meal, disperse…And when you ask his wives for any 
object, ask them from behind a hijab; that is cleaner for your hearts and 
theirs…146 
 
The Prophet frequently entertained visitors at his house, some of whom were not 
necessarily explicitly invited nor encouraged to stay for long periods of time. After 
marrying his wife Zainab, the wedding festivities continued late into the night and the 
Prophet Muhammad’s home was filled with guests, some of whom lingered on long after 
the appropriate time of departure. The above verse was revealed in this context, as a 
means of allowing the Prophet’s wives at least some semblance of domestic privacy.147 
Given these circumstances, it is likely that the literal meaning of ‘hijab’ was that of a 
physical curtain to be pulled shut should the wives desire some time to themselves amidst 
the constant flux of visitors. This tangible yet temporary partition has taken on the much 
more broad-spectrum meaning of seclusion in general. The extent of this seclusion varies 
by interpretation, ranging from a mere scarf to connote modesty to women’s complete 
seclusion and separation from the rest of society. 148 
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All the same, a brief analysis of verses pertaining to the hijab removes any sense of 
ambiguity, suggesting that the Qur’an mandates neither the full concealment of women’s 
bodies nor their physical isolation. Verse 33:59-60 reads as follows: 
O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters and the believing women, that they 
should cast their jilbab over their persons (when abroad): That is most convenient 
that they should be known and not molested… Truly, if the Hypocrites and those 
in whose hearts is a disease…desist not, we shall certainly stir thee up against 
them. 
 
Before delving into any of the historical asbab al-nuzul, it is necessary to note that the 
term ‘hijab’ is not used at all in this verse. Instead, the Qur’an uses the term ‘jilbab’ 
(‘outer garment’), thereby referring to a garment that traditionally covers only the bosom 
and neck and no more of the body. As is made evident in the verse above, the jilbab was 
not suggested in this context as a means of preventing men from viewing women’s 
bodies. Instead, it “served as a marker of Jahili male sexual promiscuity and abuse at a 
time when women had no legal recourse and had to rely on themselves for protection.”149  
Returning again to pre-Islamic Arabia and the time of ignorance, one may recall that 
women possessed no rights or freedoms whatsoever. Although their slave-like status was 
drastically reformed with the advent of Islam, “believing women” still required some 
means of differentiating themselves—a symbolic shield from the “Jahili men” who 
might otherwise assume they were “nonbelievers and thus fair game” for abuse. It is 
somewhat paradoxical that a garment originally intended to protect women from male 
lechery has been twisted so as to become a necessity guarding against “female immorality 
and inferiority.”150 
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The final verse typically upheld in support of female subjugation is 24:30-31. Note again 
that the word ‘hijab’ is not present: 
Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their private 
parts: that is purer for them… And say to the believing women that they should 
cast down their gaze and guard their private parts and they display not their 
adornment save what is apparent of it; and to draw their khumar over their 
bosoms, and they display not their adornment save to their husbands or their 
fathers…151 
 
The word ‘khumar,’ while possessing one possible definition meaning ‘to veil the head 
and face of a woman,’ also comes from the root that merely means ‘to cover, hide, 
conceal.’ Indeed, the semantic associations in the rest of this verse suggest a less stringent 
interpretation of the word—one that necessarily “establishes that people must be free to 
look upon each other publicly” and not be concealed or isolated from one another.152 For 
one thing, the verse clearly advises modesty for both men and women. The only stated 
difference between its counsel to men and women is the mention of women’s 
“adornments.” While this term does initially appear rather vague, the subsequent line 
helps to clarify this ambiguity, instructing women to “draw their khumar over their 
bosoms.” Although this phrase does not explicitly define the term ‘adornments’ as a 
reference to women’s ‘bosoms,’ the parallel syntax seems to suggest as much. Devoid of 
a clearly stated explanation, however, conservatives still cite ‘adornments’ as a reference 
to not just women’s bosoms, but also their “hair and faces” as well.153  
 
Still, ‘adornments’ aside, there are other indications that this verse was not intended to 
advocate women’s entire physical seclusion or covering. Barlas points out that, in 
addition to referencing the veil as an article of clothing, the verse is perhaps also 
concerned with a veil that is more emblematic than it is tangible—that of the 
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“eyes/gaze.”154 With its statement that men and women “cast down their gaze,” the 
Qur’an suggests that people themselves can act as their own veil through respectful 
conduct, serving as their own enforcers of modesty. Men and women are both given the 
same stipulations with regard to modesty, thereby implying their mutual responsibilities 
to one another and to themselves. As a corollary, the fact that the verse actually states the 
necessity of “cast[ing] down one’s eyes” guards against interpretations that argue in favor 
of women’s complete segregation in society; there would be no need for such a 
recommendation if men and women were already set apart from one another in 
seclusion.155  
 
The preceding Qur’anic analyses demonstrate the potential fallacies in Islamist arguments 
that rely on the Qur’an or other Islamic principles to support restrictions on women’s 
dress. As exhibited, the Qur’anic verses pertaining to the hijab do not explicitly require 
women to remain entirely covered or segregated and in fact suggest an equal and 
reasonable amount of modesty for both men and women. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that these more conservative or misogynistic views related to women’s seclusion and 
coverings do exist and certain Islamic voices attempt to justify them through religious 
ideology. These occurrences do nothing to help mitigate the already-existent Western 
perception of the veil as a symbol of Muslim women’s oppression. Leila Ahmed devotes 
an ample amount of analysis in her book Women and Gender in Islam to what she terms 
the “colonial narrative” and the “resistance narrative”—narratives she argues perhaps 
paradoxically mirror one another. As the veil marked the “inferiority of Islamic 
societies…and the backwardness of Islam” to Western eyes, it simultaneously came to 
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represent the “dignity and validity of all native customs…and the need to tenaciously 
affirm them as a means of resistance to Western domination” on the other side of the 
spectrum.156  This phenomenon is one that was evident with the dawn of colonialism 
hundreds of years ago, and it is just as prominent today within countries such as Iraq. 
While the United States cultivated an image of itself as a liberator, freeing Muslim 
women from oppression tangibly represented through the veil, those under attack clung 
even more tightly to their customs and traditional ways of life. As Ahmed postulates, the 
hijab is just as rhetorically and symbolically powerful for resistance movements as it is 
for the West.  
 
The next section will elaborate in much greater detail on these ideas, demonstrating how 
conservative interpretations of Islamic ideas relating to the hijab and the rest of the 
personal status matters analyzed in this chapter are taken to a dramatic extreme in post-
Saddam Iraq, where women currently face immense threats of psychological and physical 
violence.  The comprehensive examination of each relevant Qur’anic verse and its asbab 
al-nuzul is a critically potent tool for countering the prevailing threat of Islamist violence. 
Religiously-justified misogyny can and must be countered using arguments that rely on 
just as many Islamic principles—arguments that take extremists’ selective readings of 
Qur’anic verses and place them back into their historical context and their context as 
merely one piece of Revelation’s greater Weltanschauung.  
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Chapter 3 
THE OMNIPRESENT THREAT OF 
VIOLENCE FOR IRAQI WOMEN 
 
“The women…are being horrifically murdered and then dumped in the garbage with notes saying they were 
killed for violating Islamic teachings… Sectarian groups are trying to force a strict interpretation of 
Islam…They send their vigilantes to roam the city, hunting down those who are deemed to be behaving 
against their [the extremists’] own interpretations.” 
- Bassem al-Moussawi, head of Basra Security Committee 
 
 
The Qur’anic analyses and examples from Prophet Muhammad’s life presented in the 
previous chapter are invaluable tools in the fight against misogynistic violence in the 
name of Islam. Political and militant Islamists’ religious arguments possess a powerful 
appeal within society, one that offers comfort and a sense of stability and continuity to 
those within a chaotic war zone such as Iraq. It is precisely because of the pervasive 
appeal of Islam, however, that these misogynistic and conservative religious 
interpretations are best deconstructed using Islamic sources themselves. The following 
chapter will provide a more in-depth examination and analysis of the omnipresent 
threat—both psychologically and physically—that women currently face at the behest of 
some Islamist groups within Iraq. The concluding chapter will then apply the Islamic 
analyses presented in Chapter Two to these realities in Iraq, arguing in favor of religion 
itself as a potent strategy toward eradicating Islamist misogyny and violence.  
 
A Brief History of Women’s Rights in Iraq 
 
In order to develop an adequate understanding of the status of women in Iraq today, it is 
critical to first possess a cursory awareness of their status throughout modern Iraqi 
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history. As in my previous analyses of Qur’anic revelation, context is key—offering a 
window into the circumstances that helped bring women to where they are at present.  
Qasim Amin, a well-known Egyptian scholar, is remembered as one of the most 
outspoken advocates for women’s rights in Islam in the 19th century.157 Contrary to 
popular perceptions regarding the situation of women in Iraq, Amin’s declaration that 
“women [are] central to progress and modernization” is one that fits relatively well with 
much of Iraqi history.158  Indeed, even amidst their somewhat variable levels of freedom, 
women in Iraq still lived in one of the more progressive societies in the Middle East up 
until the 1990s. Iraqi women were involved in civil society as early as the 1920s, forming 
groups such as the Women’s Awakening Club, which offered a venue for women to 
engage in political discussions and to enhance their literary skills. This group, and others 
formed in subsequent years, became instrumental in raising awareness of women’s 
concerns, particularly those relevant to education and family rights.159 Although these 
efforts did not translate into legal equality at the time, the mere existence of women’s 
organizations foreshadowed women’s eventual active (and government-sanctioned) 
participation in the public sphere.   
 
Ironically, women’s most progressive time period in Iraqi history occurred under the 
Ba’ath Party’s160 watch, a secular political party that was associated with repressive 
political control and societal oppression. Fondly referred to as the “days of plenty,” the 
1970s and early 1980s constituted a period of immense economic growth and social 
progressivism for Iraq. While the Ba’ath did curb the creation of independent women’s 
organizations and unions in favor of their own bureaucratically-regulated group known as 
 58
the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW), women were granted enhanced 
employment opportunities. Amidst a favorable oil market and a soaring economy, the 
government not only possessed the impetus to continue to buttress its own industries and 
internal labor force, but the financial capacity to make governmental employment 
appealing to potential employees. Offering services such as childcare that catered 
exclusively to women, the Ba’ath also instituted programs with an exclusive focus on 
women’s education. The regime even went as far as legally requiring “all illiterate 
persons between ages fifteen and forty-five…to attend classes at local ‘literacy 
centers.’”161 Unlike elsewhere in the Middle East at the time, women were viewed as 
essential components of Iraq’s workforce—valuable contributors to the country’s 
economic prowess.  
 
Moreover, the Ba’ath government quashed the influence of religious parties and leaders 
in an effort to crack down on any possible threat of waning centralized control. In this 
way, even those conservative Islamic ideologies that did exist were suppressed and 
shielded from tangible influence in the public sphere. These restrictions allowed Ba’athi 
dictators such as Hassan al-Bakr and, later, Saddam Hussein, to ensure that people’s 
loyalties lay solely with the centralized government.162 This tactic is characteristic of 
dictatorships worldwide, which thrive on power and seek to preempt, often through brutal 
means, any and all suspected threats.  Keeping this sort of a governing philosophy in 
mind, it is also not at all surprising that the Ba’ath regime was initially quite supportive 
of women’s contributions to society outside of the private confines of the home. Women 
were, after all, just as much Iraqi citizens as men, and their support was just as much 
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desired and needed to maintain a tight grip on power. Given that female support was 
more easily acquired and maintained when immersed in public life, the government 
actively sought to include women in the workforce, and to a lesser and strictly controlled 
extent, in the public affairs of the state.163 Clearly, the government’s promulgation of 
women’s rights was largely motivated by the desire for power and economic strength as 
opposed to a fervent belief in egalitarian principles.164 Still, as scholar and University of 
London Reader Nadje al-Ali pointed out in an interview, the fact still remains that no 
matter how cynical the motivation, the government-supported image of the “good Iraqi 
woman” in the 1970s and 1980s was equivalent to that of the “educated working 
woman”—a view that allowed Iraqi women many more opportunities than women in 
other parts of the Middle East.165 
This depiction of women changed with the subsequent Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and 
still more drastically, the first Gulf War and the resulting economic sanctions. The 
conflict in the 1980s saw the propagation of the notion that men were expected to defend 
the homeland from foreign attack and, in so doing, preserve the honor and integrity of 
Iraqi society, notably including Iraqi women.166 As the concept of honor was already 
well-established in Iraqi culture, women came to constitute a corporeal manifestation of 
the land itself, symbolically representing that which necessitated shielding. The enhanced 
militarization of society in the wake of conflict marked a stark contrast to the prior focus 
on social services and economic development.167 As conceptions of masculinity such as 
the “fighter, the defender of his nation, and the martyr” became increasingly valued, 
women’s education and contributions to the labor force were no longer as important as 
their capacity to bear sons who would contribute to the future Iraqi army.168  These 
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circumstances were further exacerbated by the U.S.-initiated economic sanctions against 
Iraq after its invasion in Kuwait. While these sanctions had a debilitating economic effect 
on collective Iraqi society, their repercussions had a disproportionately negative effect on 
women in particular.169  Even ignoring the waning governmental support for women’s 
education and employment opportunities, the financial crisis and soaring unemployment 
rates associated with the sanctions inhibited many families from funding their children’s 
education. Girls were often the first victims of these constrictions, as families tended to 
use what little money they had to send their sons to school.170  
Moreover, the governmental suppression of religious groups that had so characterized the 
“years of plenty” in the 1970s took an opposite turn with the onset of the Gulf War. 
Surrounded by chaos and instability, people began to rely more heavily on religion—on 
Islam—for solace and continuity. Wishing to maintain the support of the populace, 
Saddam Hussein sought to harness these sentiments of enhanced religiosity and began to 
relax some of the former restrictions.171 The Ba’ath government not only lacked the 
financial capabilities to continue its provision of welfare and employment benefits that 
had previously aided women, but it also upheld a more conservative ideology as it sought 
to win the support of those seeking religion as a source of comfort through actions such 
as harshly speaking out against prostitution and requiring women to have an escort upon 
leaving the country.172 The “good Iraqi woman,” Nadje al-Ali explains, was no longer 
someone well-educated and hardworking, but instead someone who kept house, raised 
her children, and behaved dutifully toward her husband.173 Just as greater “women’s 
rights” had been the political gambit of choice in the earlier decades, so, too, was the 
newfound support of religion a “political tool to consolidate power.”174 Nevertheless, the 
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reality was still that religious groups could wield considerably more influence over 
society—influence that, especially from the more radical Islamist groups, contributed to a 
tide of conservatism that would only grow with the collapse of the centralized 
government in 2003.  
Causes of the Current Violence 
 
 
Before delving into the specifics of the current realities within Iraq, it is useful to 
examine the preeminent and enduring catalysts of psychological and physical violence 
against women. As the brief examination of Iraqi history demonstrates, the stage was set 
for rising conservatism and the emergence of Islamism, the political use of Islam, in the 
years leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion. Even in the 1990s when Saddam Hussein 
granted religious parties greater societal functionality, they were still largely unable to act 
without explicit governmental sponsorship or support.175 For years, Islamist ideologies 
existed beneath the surface of Iraqi society, unable to fully materialize amidst the 
dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. Once the U.S. toppled the regime in 2003, however, 
Iraq was left devoid of any sort of centralized governmental or institutional structure. As 
such, “religious influences that had been sweeping the Arab world for decades but had 
lain underground in Iraq emerged into the open and began to fill the void.”176 
Conservative militias began to take control of towns and cities across Iraq, particularly in 
the South, often enforcing their rule through violence in the name of religion.177  
 
Even after general stability was restored in Baghdad, its reach was neither enduring nor 
widespread, confined as it was largely to the capital city. Power remained extraordinarily 
 62
decentralized, thereby permitting Islamist militias to maintain their strongholds over 
various areas of the country, including within certain districts of Baghdad itself.178 Left 
without anyone else to turn to for security or governance, many Iraqi women became 
more and more enveloped within the Islamists’ cultivated penumbra of terror.179 
       In her blog, Riverbend gives a powerful account of her experience in Baghdad:  
I look at my older clothes—the jeans and t-shirts and colorful skirts—and it’s like 
I’m studying a wardrobe from another country, another lifetime. There was a 
time, a couple of years ago, when you could more or less wear what you 
wanted… [Now,] there’s always that risk of getting stopped in the car and 
checked by one militia or another… There are the men in head-to-toe black and 
the turbans, the extremists and fanatics who were liberated by the occupation, and 
at some point, you tire of the defiance. You no longer want to be seen. I feel like 
the black or white scarf I fling haphazardly on my head as I walk out the door 
makes me invisible to a certain degree—it’s easier to blend in with the masses 
shrouded in black. If you’re a female, you don’t want the attention—you don’t 
want it from the Iraqi police, you don’t want it from the black-clad militia man… 
You don’t want to be noticed or seen.180 
 
Islamist violence was an unfortunate symptom of the post-2003 decentralization, but this 
is not to say that an internal coup or other source of instability would not have caused the 
same sort of phenomenon to occur. The United States’ invasion was merely a trigger, 
while the real igniter is instead linked to decades of Ba’athi suppression of religious 
groups, who were eager to fill the power vacuum left by Saddam’s overthrow. 
 
These groups are not, however, limited to militias employing physically violent tactics. In 
fact, another preeminent contributor to the dire situation for Iraqi women is the often-
underreported nexus between Islamist militias and (at least ostensibly) democratically-
elected Islamist parties in Baghdad. The more the elected Islamists silently stand by in 
the face of blatant violence from their militant counterparts, the more these physically-
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violent groups feel justified in their actions.181 The situation is, of course, only intensified 
when one considers that many of the various police forces are infiltrated by militants, 
rendering law enforcement virtually indistinguishable from the threats themselves in 
many cases.182 This was an enormous concern in the years leading up to 2008 especially, 
and though police forces are demonstrably more effective in recent years, there is still 
little means of determining whether certain members of the law enforcement community 
may act as double agents.  
 
Moreover, militias roaming the streets of Iraq espouse a fundamentalist ideology that is 
echoed by some of the more impressionable or staunchly conservative mosque imams, or 
religious leaders: “Sheikh Salah Muzidin, an imam at a mosque in Baghdad, was reported 
as saying, ‘These incidents of abuse just prove what we have been saying for so long. 
That it is the Islamic duty of women to stay in their homes, looking after children and 
husbands rather than searching for work.’”183 These ideological currents penetrate up 
from the more localized level, reaching Islamist militias’ political counterparts in 
Baghdad and helping to propel attempts at institutionalizing religiously-based misogyny 
into law.184 Though the specifics of this connection will be elaborated on later in this 
chapter, it is worth noting that those more extremist political and militant Islamist groups 
created a mutually reinforcing cycle of violence—violence that constitutes a double-
edged sword, existing as much on a psychological and political level as on a physical 
level. 
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There is, in addition to the aforementioned decentralization and symbiotic relationship 
between political and militant Islamists, another critical dimension to the surge of 
violence against women. U.S. rhetoric, especially under the Bush administration as 
previously demonstrated, focuses on the need to “sprea[d] the hope of liberty in the 
Middle East” and enforces the notion that “military dictatorship and theocratic rule are a 
straight, smooth highway to nowhere.”185 The situation with regard to women often 
constitutes a concrete emblem of these ideas, rhetorically expounded upon so as to further 
allude to Arab oppression: “These nations can show by their example that honest 
government, and respect for women…can triumph in the Middle East.”186 Confronted 
with these charges, many Iraqis deflect the symbolic representation of women in a 
different way. As in the past during the days of colonialism, which was in part justified 
on grounds of liberating women, ensuring control of women and imprisoning them within 
a traditional sphere becomes a way to stand up to the foreign invaders, to assert one’s 
independence in the face of imposed foreign ideologies, and more importantly, to assert 
some lever of power over a society increasingly under foreign control.187 
 
Clad in the already widely-recognized hijab, women constitute a tangible differentiation 
between Iraqi and Western culture. In this way, many Iraqis have perhaps 
uncharacteristically clung tight to their traditions as a means of rebellion and an assertion 
of identity. These sentiments alone are not all that unusual; the desire to hold onto that 
which one feels is under assault is indeed a normal human reaction that is observable 
throughout Middle Eastern history. In her chapter entitled “Discourse of the Veil,” Leila 
Ahmed focuses extensively on this phenomenon as it played out in Egypt under British 
 65
occupation beginning in 1882. She describes the societal rift that developed between the 
foreigners and the rest of the Egyptian populace. As the British and their sympathizers 
upheld the veil as a symbol of Islamic backwardness and inferiority, the Egyptians felt 
the need to staunchly assert their identity by holding fast to custom.188  
 
These narratives—the “colonial narrative” and the “resistance narrative,” in Ahmed’s 
words—are just as observable within Iraq today as they were in Egypt.189 When coupled 
with the more extreme religious ideologies of Islamist groups, however, these more 
routine reactions take on an entirely more dangerous and radical dimension. Yanar 
Mohammed, an active and outspoken Iraqi human rights activist, describes the situation 
from personal observation: 
When an Islamist militia wants to take control of a neighborhood, imposing the 
veil on women is the first point on their agenda. It is their way of claiming power 
over the area. In Sadr City, you no longer see a single woman without the veil… 
It is not that these women have suddenly become more religious. It is because 
they will be killed if they do not wear the veil… When a political party gains 
control of an area, it puts its flag everywhere. The flag is a message to your 
opponents that this is your area and they should not dare to step onto it. The veil 
on women is like a flag now.190 
 
Women’s symbolism goes still one step further when delving into the political realm. 
Laws most frequently associated with women’s rights, such as personal status codes,191 
are also typically those that apply predominantly to the private realm of the home. It is 
much more difficult for an invader to take control over what happens behind closed doors 
with regard to the relationship between a husband and wife than, say, that between a 
judge and a criminal.  
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Consequently, there exists a sector of more extreme Islamist parties in Baghdad that 
uphold conservative family laws partially as a means of demonstrating their influence and 
rule against the U.S. and its allies. The mindset, perhaps, is that the U.S. may readily 
exert its influence over reformulating a sizeable amount of Iraq’s legal system, as the 
colonialists did in the past, but those more traditional practices within the home are 
beyond its reach or purview. It is with regard to these personal status laws that Islamist 
political parties thereby possess some of their greatest weight, particularly when they 
utilize selective Qur’anic verses or hadith as a means of garnering support and 
justification. Such efforts, much akin to the practices of Islamist militias, are in many 
ways a technique of “gain[ing] credibility and legitimacy” in the face of chaos and 
uncertainty.192 These tactics, while less overtly malicious, are just as critical to women’s 
safety in Iraq as are the physical tactics of Islamist militias. Indeed, the scars of the more 
radical political Islamists’ attempts at restricting women’s rights are not necessarily 
outwardly visible, but their psychological impact is no less cutting.  
 
An Introduction to Iraqi Politics 
 
 
The state of Iraqi politics since the 2003 invasion can only be described as convoluted 
and disorganized. Though many of the intricacies and specificities of the political parties 
and their maneuvers to gain power are beyond the scope of this paper, a brief summary of 
the evolution of politics since the fall of Saddam Hussein is useful in providing some 
context. Shortly after the dissolution of the Ba’athi government, the United States and its 
allies established the temporary Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which served as 
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the umbrella organization for Iraq’s transitional government until June 28, 2004 when it 
was replaced with a series of subsequent organizations before finally translating into 
Iraq’s first permanent government on May 20, 2006.193 Prior to its suspension, the CPA 
instituted the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) as a mechanism for Iraqi involvement in the 
reconstruction process. Many members of the IGC were individuals representing more 
conservative religious parties—parties that continue to dominate Iraqi politics in the 
present day.194  
 
The vast majority of these parties are divided along strongly sectarian and religious lines. 
Iraq can roughly be divided into three groups: the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shias. The 
Kurdish region of northern Iraq is largely an anomaly with regard to politics, violence, 
and over-arching cultural issues and thus will not be focused on in the current analysis.195 
Ali Allawi, in his book The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace 
gives a detailed explanation of the various Sunni and Shia trends in the aftermath of the 
invasion. He divides the Sunni organizations into three major camps: (1) those in the 
minority who acknowledged the shift in regime and sought to promote gender and human 
rights and reconstruction; (2) those who had previously spoken out against the Ba’ath and 
sought to exert new political influence; and (3) those in the majority who assertively 
condemned the invasion and comprised many of the Sunni militant organizations.196 It is 
with the second group of Sunnis—those with the strongest political aspirations—that I 
am concerned with regard to psychological or political violence against women. Many 
members of this group had been previously banned or exiled after expressing criticism of 
Saddam Hussein and his regime. Finally free to express themselves, the formerly 
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suppressed Sunnis are now active participants within politics, seeking to win the 
affections of the public through platforms that rely on the broad appeal of Islamic 
principles.197 
 
While certainly not suggesting that all Shias are united in their beliefs, particularly their 
political beliefs, Allawi (a Shia himself) does characterize the overall Shia trend as less 
divisive than the Sunni one. Though various Shia parties may differ as to their specific 
goals or societal prescriptions, a report from the Center for American Progress in January 
2009 states that many Shia organizations do similarly “derive their legitimacy from the 
opinions and edicts of a relatively small group of high-ranking clerical scholars in Iraq 
and Iran. While these clerics do not govern directly, they do offer opinions regarding 
what is and is not acceptable regarding government policy.”198 As a Sunni, Saddam 
Hussein mercilessly repressed the Shia majority during his time in power. Existing 
largely as an undercurrent of Iraqi society for years, the Shia developed a specific sense 
of identity all their own—an identity that became much more outwardly evident in the 
chaotic years after 2003.  
 
No longer stifled, Shia groups saw the fall of Saddam Hussein as an opportunity to finally 
exert influence over their country: “The key shift…was a move from the politics of 
‘victimisation’ to an insistence on their rights as a majority. This went beyond the simple 
assertion of majority rights and extended to the heart of the Iraqi state itself.”199 Islam, of 
course, constituted a prime facet of Shia collective identity, having been a unifying 
motivational force for so long. As such, many Shia political groups came to support 
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Islamic rule, and, accordingly, Islamist organizations, as a mechanism toward reasserting 
their identities as Iraqis. Indeed, in addition to sentiments of antipathy toward Saddam 
Hussein and a constant sense of victimization, religion bound the Shia together in their 
years of suppression, and it similarly served as the unifying theme of their ascension to 
power in the post-2003 era.200  
 
Under the auspices of the CPA, the IGC consisted of a number of representatives from 
visibly Islamist parties. Riverbend refers scornfully to each such individual as a “puppet” 
(collectively, the “darling Iraqi Puppet Council”), given their presumed level of support 
from the U.S. government. She specifically mentions Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Mohsen Abdul Hamid of the 
Iraqi Islamic Party, and Ibraheim al-Jaffari of the Islamic Da’wa Party in her blog.201 
While not every member of the IGC possessed an Islamist affiliation, religious parties did 
make up a substantial portion of the council, foreshadowing their marked influence over 
Iraqi government to this day.  
 
The Islamic Da’wa Party, ISCI (The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), and the Iraqi 
Islamic Party have been some of the most well-known and influential Islamist political 
parties in Iraq since the 2003 invasion. The Islamic Da’wa Party, roughly translating to 
the “Islamic Call Party,” is one of the few Shia Islamist groups without a directly-
affiliated militia. Founded in 1958, the group has splintered since its heyday in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the group still maintains a reasonable following, with the current Iraqi 
Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, being a member. Da’wa’s ideology is based on the ideas 
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of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a scholar from the 1960s and 1970s, who largely advocated 
for a government committed to “institut[ing] the rule of God on earth.”202 Da’wa believes 
in an Islamic government wherein the ‘ulama, religious jurists, play a dominant role with 
regard to legal jurisprudence.203 Unlike the model under Khomeini in Iran, however, the 
Da’wa party does not believe in “giving allegiance to a single marja,” or source of 
emulation.204 Instead, the party calls for what scholar Rodger Shanahan calls a “blending 
of scholars and non-scholars…that supports a technocratic rule in accordance with the 
tenets of Islam.”205 Rather than blindly following a supreme leader, Da’wa believes in the 
necessity of an additional body of jurists to provide checks and balances, known as the 
marja’iyya, or “the collective body of the most highly regarded scholarly sources of 
emulation.”206 Due to its factionalism, the party has multiple leaders including al-Maliki 
and the aforementioned al-Jaffari of the IGC. 
 
ISCI, or the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (formerly known as the Supreme Council 
for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI) was founded by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim in 
1982 as an offshoot of the Da’wa party. As Da’wa became fraught with inner divisions 
over the proper “role of the faqih (jurisprudent),” al-Hakim and his supporters split off 
and formed their own party in support of the Iranian model of wilayat al-faqih. Though 
both parties advocate an Islam-centric government, ISCI favors one that is heavily 
focused around one Supreme Leader or Ayatollah toward whom full allegiance is 
owed.207 The advisory committee of jurists that figures so prominently in Da’wa’s 
platform is less pertinent to ISCI’s ideology. ISCI is also tied to the militant Badr Corps 
(formerly the Badr Brigade), and, prior to the March 7, 2010 elections, held the “largest 
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political bloc in Iraq’s Council of Representatives.”208 After the recent elections, ISCI 
and the National Iraqi Alliance together hold the third-highest bloc of seats in the 
parliament.209 
 
Fadhila is another rival Shia party that wields influence within Iraqi politics. Though not 
cited in Riverbend’s blog, Fadhila is also an influential Shia Islamist party, albeit on a 
much more localized level. Also referred to as the Islamic Virtue Party, Fadhila operates 
preeminently in Basra, in Shia-dominated southern Iraq, and has an associated militia of 
the same name. Its leaders are Muhammad al-Yaqubi and Muhammad al-Waeli. Fadhila 
is directly tied to the Basra leadership, as one al-Waeli is actually the governor of the 
town.210  Like many of the other Islamist parties, Fadhila “claim[s] legitimacy on Shia 
religious grounds, and justifie[s] [its] often violent activities as requirements of the 
faith.”211 The Iraqi Islamic Party, an offshoot group of the Iraqi sect of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, is a “Sunni fundamentalist Islamic group.” As such, its specific aspirations 
are much more focused on restoring a Sunni majority to Iraq. Still, the party does utilize 
religious justifications and arguments in its rhetoric, believing, like many Shia Islamist 
groups, that Islam must hold a critical place in the reconstructed Iraqi government.212  
 
While understanding the background of the aforementioned Islamist organizations is 
certainly valuable, one need not get lost in the details of each group’s ideology or 
leadership chain. The bottom line: Iraqi politics, both during the time of transitional 
governing bodies or the newly-inaugurated permanent government, is brimming with the 
influence of religiously-bent organizations. There is, of course, nothing inherently 
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problematic about the existence of these groups. The problem lies within the subset of 
Islamist organizations that believe so fervently in governance through a more 
conservative Islamic lens that they inappropriately ascribe religion as justification for 
disproportionately detrimental behavior toward women. The subsequent section will offer 
an analysis of some of the legal challenges—what I term ‘psychological violence’—that 
women have faced, specifically with regard to personal status laws.  
 
Psychological Violence 
 
 
It is perhaps notable that some of the earliest and most heated legal discussions and 
conflicts within post-2003 Iraq pertained to women’s personal status rights, or their rights 
with respect to marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, and other family-related issues. 
Much as the hijab takes on a symbolic meaning of power and control for Islamist militias 
across Iraq, many Islamist political organizations treat the “subordination of women [as] 
a priority of first magnitude because it is a microcosm and precondition of the social 
order they wise to establish.”213 This prescribed social order is frequently based on 
particularly conservative and often misogynistic interpretations of Islam’s more 
egalitarian ideals—interpretations that become still more potent when politicized and 
utilized as a tactic to help gain the support and trust of Iraqis. Riverbend sums up this 
phenomenon quite poignantly when she points out that parties operating under a 
religiously-bent ideology, particularly in a country amidst immense conflict and bedlam, 
not only appeal to particular political viewpoints, but also to “fervent believers… It’s not 
about the policy or the promises or the puppet in power… You don’t question the man in 
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the chair because he is there by divine right, almost. You certainly don’t question his 
policies.”214  
 
As previously mentioned, religious groups are able to appeal to the public in ways that 
strictly secular political groups cannot. For people with whom Islam is a critical, 
comforting, and, most importantly, indigenously-derived (not foreign imposed) part of 
their lives, religion and, accordingly, the parties that support it, represents an ideal 
vehicle for change. Indeed, Islamic law could represent precisely that if only it were 
based on Islam’s original tenets. Instead, women, many of whom are largely unaware of 
their rights, find themselves shocked to realize that the “Islamic law” they had 
passionately supported is actually one that is rather detrimental to their freedoms and 
equality.215 The problem in the majority of these cases is not Islam, but instead the 
manner in which it is being interpreted and applied; to be sure, the Qur’an and the Sunna 
“giv[e] women certain unalterable, nonnegotiable rights. The problem arises when… 
Shari’a [is] drastically different from one cleric to another.”216 
 
One of the earliest illustrative instances of Islamist parties’ politicized attempts at 
subverting women’s rights through Islamic law occurred before any sort of official 
transitional law was even established in Iraq. The IGC was only in existence for a short 
time when a decree was passed on December 29, 2003 that sought to make substantial 
alterations to the current Personal Status Law, which was codified in 1959. Staunchly 
supported by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of SCIRI, Decree 137 would essentially substitute for 
the older law one entirely written and inspired by religious leaders and institutions.217 It 
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included various misogynistic provisions including lowering the age of marriage to nine, 
permitting mut’ah (or temporary marriage), and establishing “stoning, acid, and severe 
flogging” as punishments specifically reserved for females convicted of adultery, the 
decree circumvented many of the more progressive provisions that exist in the 1959 
code.218  
 
Though by no means fully reflecting the true Islamic equity illustrated in the previous 
chapter, the 1959 Personal Status Law was viewed by many as one of the most 
progressive personal status laws in the region. Claimed to have been based on the 
principles put forth in a variety of Islamic legal schools,219 the code establishes eighteen 
as the minimum age for marriage, drastically restricts and regulates polygamy, and 
forbids temporary or forced marriages.220 As such, Decree 137 represented an enormous 
step backwards for many Iraqi women as pertaining to marriage, divorce, child custody, 
and other related issues.221 Riverbend, in her blog entries from early 2004, bemoans the 
situation as she declares, “My head has been spinning these last few days… I’m not the 
only one—everyone I talk to is shaking their head in dismay. How is this happening? 
How are we caving into fundamentalism?”222  
 
The answers to Riverbend’s questions are quite elusive, but can be at least partially traced 
again to the symbolism associated with women, and more specifically their statuses 
within the family, in present-day Iraq. Islamist parties that were suppressed under 
Saddam Hussein’s rule saw a change in the personal status law as a “symbolic break from 
the past, as well as from the U.S. occupation, which had also claimed women as a symbol 
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of the new Iraq.”223 Decree 137 sparked such uproar among women’s rights activists 
throughout the country that it was eventually retracted from discussion.224 Still, these 
efforts to implement a new, harsher personal status law foreshadow future Islamist 
attempts at similar conservative proposals—proposals that, despite being justified 
through religion, dramatically deviate from both the Qur’an’s core tenets and the 
Prophet’s living example. At the same time, however, the Decree 137 situation also 
foreshadows the potential for future successes as a result of collective female political 
initiative. 
 
The failure of that initial endeavor at personal status law modification has not stopped the 
Islamist-backed government from other attempts at restricting women’s rights in the 
name of Islam. A 2007 report from the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq asserts 
that “Khedeir Abbas, the Secretary General of the Iraqi Ministers’ Council, began 
requiring all women employees to wear headscarves or be fired” in 2005.225 Additionally, 
the Iraqi Interior Ministry further “echo[ed] directives of religious leaders” when it issued 
a proclamation in 2006 strongly suggesting that women remain in the home.226 Even the 
current Iraqi constitution, which requires gender equality (Article 14), possesses certain 
articles that arguably pave the way for abuses against women in the name of Islam.227  
 
The two most controversial articles in the Constitution are Articles 2 and 41, both of 
which open the door for both misogynistic and moderate Islamic interpretations. Article 2 
establishes Islam as the “official religion of the State” and “a fundamental source of 
legislation,” meaning that “no law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam 
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may be established.”228 The potential trouble with this article is not that Islam is 
established as the official state religion, but instead the ambiguity as to what specifically 
constitutes Islam’s “established provisions.” As argued in the previous chapter, there 
exist an enormous number of ways in which Islamic principles have been interpreted, 
institutionalized, and upheld over time. Theoretically, if this provision were to truthfully 
protect against practices in violation of Islam, any radical Islamist attempt at 
circumventing women’s rights through religion would be in direct violation of the core 
Islamic principles of gender equality, mutual respect, and continual reform over time.  
 
Article 41 arguably provides the capacity for personal status laws to differ by region and 
religious sect within Iraq. It states: “Iraqis are free in their adherence to their personal 
status according to their own religion, sect, belief and choice, and that will be organized 
by law.”229 Some Iraqis fear that this article essentially institutes somewhat of a 
confessional system of governance wherein leaders would be starkly differentiated from 
one another by religion or other sectarian identity. Especially when coupled with the fact 
that decentralization allowed many religious militias to take control of towns beyond 
Baghdad, Article 41 could grant each of these various Islamist groups the leniency to 
establish personal status laws in accordance with their own versions of Islam, no matter 
how conservative.230 This capacity for inconsistency greatly enhances the odds of groups 
taking another swing at personal status codes that resemble Decree 137—codes that 
“legaliz[e] discriminatory practices with regard to marriage, divorce, child custody, and 
inheritance.”231 Of course, at the same time, Article 41 also does nothing to prevent more 
moderate Islamic organizations from implementing personal status laws that more closely 
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resemble the egalitarian principles of the Qur’an articulated in Chapter Two. These 
constitutional issues are merely some examples of legal threats women may face in the 
coming years.  
 
Physical Violence  
 
In addition to their capacity for misogyny within the governmental sphere, some Islamist 
political parties tacitly, yet significantly, contribute to the physical violence within Iraq. 
Certain Islamist organizations holding prominent places in Iraq’s government have 
militias that patrol the streets in areas outside the realm of federal government control. 
ISCI, for instance, which at one point not only had the largest bloc of elected members in 
the Iraqi Parliament but also had the largest number of governors (namely, eight of the 
eighteen Iraqi provinces), is directly associated with the Badr Corps.232 Many of the 
members of this militia have actually been integrated into Iraqi security forces and local 
police stations, leaving questions as to where loyalties truly lie.233 This issue varies in 
severity throughout Iraq, with Basra being perhaps one of the worst areas; a former 
governor there estimates “that as many as 90 percent of officers” held strong ties with 
Islamist organizations.234 Still, the inherent ambiguity associated with these issues makes 
their extent difficult to thoroughly evaluate, and the threat of militant infiltration within 
Iraqi law enforcement therefore remains a possibility even with security improvements.   
 
Laith Kubba, the Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Branch of The 
National Endowment for Democracy who served in the Prime Minister’s office in Iraq, 
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shared an anecdote in an interview regarding this issue. He described a number of rape 
cases, which occurred at local police centers. After reviewing the files with the help of 
the Prime Minister, Kubba found that, shockingly, these occurrences were widespread 
throughout Baghdad, and Iraq more generally. He said, “if this sort of ultimate form of 
violence is occurring at the police centers themselves, you can only imagine the level of 
intimidation taking place in offices, in neighborhoods—intimidation that is largely being 
carried out in the name of religion to keep women ‘in their rightful places.’ The issue 
here is not Islam; these are social problems into which Islam has been wrongfully 
injected.”235 
 
Another example of this nexus between politics and militancy is Moqtada al-Sadr, a 
leading Shiite leader who heads both the political Sadrist Trend and the once-powerful 
Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army). Al-Sadr’s organizational hub lies in the aptly-named 
Sadr City, where it is split into twelve committees that are each responsible for 
overseeing one particular area of society. Ranging from “Friday prayers, health services, 
media, religious edicts, and Islamic law courts” to “electricity and telecommunications,” 
the most notorious committee is certainly The Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice (PCPV).236 The PCPV, which exists within many other Islamist militant groups as 
well, is entrusted with ensuring women wear the hijab and conform appropriately to al-
Sadr’s conservative societal prescriptions, often with the use of death threats and brutal 
force.237 
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There are many other Islamist militant groups that are not explicitly tied to a political 
party, yet are no less dangerous or significant to this study; physical violence against 
women in the name of religion is a grave issue no matter who specifically is committing 
it. Still, the existence of these connections between Islamist parties central to Iraq’s 
government and the militants responsible for hundreds of women’s deaths and 
disappearances must not be minimized. The failure to take political measures to protect 
against campaigns that enforce women’s physical repression on a localized level awards a 
degree of unspoken legitimacy to Islamist militias—a further reinforcement of ideologies 
that stray far from the Islamic ideals.   
 
The volume of instances of religiously-motivated violence in Iraq is truly staggering, 
especially when considering the tragic dearth of research on these occurrences. Though it 
is immensely difficult to find reliable statistics on the issue due to the constantly-evolving 
nature of the conflict and the fact that so many violent crimes are never reported, there 
are some quantitative estimates. One report by Muslim women reformers indicates that 
Basra officials state that fifteen women are killed monthly in the province, despite reports 
from “ambulance drivers indicat[ing] they pick up many more bodies every morning 
when they ‘clean’ the streets. Islamists maintain that those women who are not counted in 
the official statistics were promiscuous or adulterous.”238 A 2008 report from the Basra 
Security Committee stated that at least “one hundred and thirty-three women were killed” 
in 2007 in Basra alone for “violating Islamic teachings,” and this number is a bare 
minimum of reported deaths for one province in one year.239  A Human Rights Watch 
report from 2005 offers numbers relevant to more circumscribed time periods, citing an 
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incident on March 8, 2005 when three women were killed in Baghdad because “an 
unspecified religious movement had accused them of being prostitutes.”240  
 
The same report refers to an article in Newsweek that chronicled the deaths of thirty-five 
women in Mosul and Baghdad who were brutally murdered from March 2003 until 
January 2005, often for no reason other than independently running a business. Zina al-
Qushtaini, the owner of a Baghdad pharmacy, was one such victim who was suddenly 
kidnapped by militants, her body found days later cloaked in an ’abaya.241 A 2008 report 
put out by a group called Women for Women International surveyed over 1500 Iraqi 
women and found that “63.9% of respondents stated that violence against women is 
increasing,” with many women strongly feeling that respect for women’s freedom has 
declined.242 This 63.9% varies quite dramatically when accounting for geography, 
increasing to 91.8% in Central Iraq and 72% in Baghdad, and decreasing to 52.9% in 
Kurdistan, 56.7% in Southern Iraq, and 50% in Kirkuk.243 
 
Nevertheless, one need not rely on specific numerical figures as proof of these violent 
attacks at the hands of Islamist militias. Even amidst the limited scholarship on this 
subject, there are countless news reports and interviews with Iraqi women’s rights 
activists that chronicle the dire situation through anecdotes alone. The examples truly 
abound. Riverbend describes a militia affiliate of SCIRI that set up an office near a 
friend’s school:  
Men in black turbans and dubious, shady figures dressed in black from head to 
foot, stand around the gates of bureaus in clusters, scanning the girls and teachers 
entering the secondary school. The dark frowning figures stand ogling, leering 
and sometimes jeering at the ones not wearing a hijab or whose skirts aren’t long 
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enough. In some areas, girls risk being attacked with acid if their clothes aren’t 
‘proper.’244 
Indeed, an American Bar Association report described the horrific experience of a 23-
year-old woman who was “permanently disfigured” after she was doused in acid when 
seen without a hijab.245 Morever, a news report from the Integrated Regional Information 
Network (IRIN) cites a chilling statement from Harith el-Ethari of Muqtada al-Sadr’s 
political following that proclaims the existence of a “concrete religious principle that says 
wearing makeup and foregoing a headscarf in public is a sin.”246 These sentiments are 
echoed in blood-red Arabic graffiti in Basra that reads, “We warn against not wearing a 
headscarf and wearing makeup. Those who do not abide by this will be punished. God is 
our witness, we have notified you.”247  
 
Those women who are not killed through Islamist groups themselves and are instead 
raped or otherwise mistreated are at times “sacrificed” by family members in order to 
preserve family honor. Some women simply cannot endure the feelings of shame, 
choosing to burn themselves in order to end their lives.248 Although women holding 
public office or espousing more moderate ideas concerning human rights are often sought 
after and targeted, “women are assassinated just because they are women” as well.249 
Women across Iraq report that they live in “constant fear” of attack from those who do 
not approve of the position or color of their hijab, their right to drive, or even their rights 
to “danc[e] and socializ[e] with men.”250 CNN’s interview with a middle-aged artist and 
professor named Safana sums up the situation quite succinctly when she declares, “Fear, 
fear is always there… We don’t know who to be afraid of. Maybe it’s a friend or a 
student you teach. There is no break, no security. I don’t know who to be afraid of.”251 
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Rather than provide comfort in a time of chaos and destruction, Islamist groups’ 
politicization of religion has instead cultivated a veil of fear that is suffocating society. 
 
The issue of physical violence, especially when considered in association with the 
political Islamist side of the spectrum, has a number of implications for women in Iraq. 
Notwithstanding the colossal state of fear under which many Iraqi women live their lives, 
and the constant threat of injury, death, or legally-curtailed freedoms, Islamists’ use of 
religious rhetoric to justify both psychological and physical violence casts an incredibly 
negative light on Islam. Rather than affirming the egalitarian principles put forth through 
the Qur’an and through the Prophet Muhammad’s example, Islamists are conflating 
centuries of purely patriarchal, and male-derived Islamic teachings with the core 
principles of the religion itself—principles that should theoretically guarantee women 
numerous rights and allow for continued evolution of these rights as society 
progresses.252 The preeminent question is not whether or not Iraq should be an Islamic 
state; religion is far too entrenched to remove it from the picture entirely. Instead, one 
must focus on the specific kind of Islamic state Iraq should espouse: one that relies 
heavily on the more misogynistic institutionalized conceptions of religious law or one 
that draws principally from the sources of Islam and promotes a more moderate and 
evolutionary form of religious rule, particularly with regard to women rights.  
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Chapter Four 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
“If we as believers want to live according to the tenets of our faith, a simplistic call to return to an idealized 
‘golden age’ of Islam that has little bearing on the realities of today’s world cannot be the answer. And yet, 
the answers can be found within our faith – if only we have the intellectual vigor, the moral courage, and 
the political will to strive for a more enlightened and progressive understanding of our faith in our search 
for answers to deal with our changing times and circumstances.” 
- Zainah Anwar, leader of Sisters in Islam253 
 
 
Chapter Two provided an in-depth analysis of the core Islamic source, the Qur’an, which 
provides powerful evidence of Islam’s inherent equity between both genders. Chapter 
Three focused on some of the ways that misogynistic religious interpretations are used 
against women in Iraq today, specifically by members of Islamist militias and political 
parties. The arguments in Chapter Two can and should be used to combat the acts and 
rhetoric of those described in Chapter Three. In other words, the powerful pro-women 
arguments detailed in Chapter Two should be utilized when considering potential 
strategies for alleviating violence against women and combating some of its more 
extremist theological underpinnings. It is my recommendation that U.S. reconstructive 
policy in Iraq move away from an entirely secularized approach and instead work to 
harness and cultivate the principles of egalitarianism so pervasively put forth in the 
Qur’an—utilizing religion to combat religion.  
 
Despite the manner in which Islam is at times portrayed through Islamist rhetoric and 
ideology, the core Islamic principles are not misogynistic even if they have been 
interpreted and codified that way by certain influential groups and individuals throughout 
Islamic history. In stark contrast to their status as inferior chattel in the years before 
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Islam’s inception, women experienced an enormous upsurge in their societal standing and 
image after the advent of Islam. The specific verses and examples put forth in Chapter 
Two illustrate the ways in which the Qur’an elevated the status of women not only by 
establishing fundamental equality between men and women, but also by strengthening 
their rights in key areas such as marriage, divorce, and polygamy. In addition, the Prophet 
Muhammad illustrated through his personal example the ways in which he felt women 
should be treated. As Chapter Two demonstrated, there are numerous hadith that recount 
the Prophet’s immense amount of respect and kindness towards his wives, as well as his 
concern for maintaining justice between the genders in society as a whole. Armed with an 
understanding of the Qur’an’s overall theme of gradual progress toward egalitarianism 
and social justice within society, an awareness of the continual need to reassess it in light 
of modern realities, and finally, an appreciation for its polysemous nature which allows 
for multiple interpretations of key grammatical clauses, it is not difficult for one to 
conceive of Islam as a tool, rather than an obstacle, for ensuring the protection and 
enhancement of women’s rights throughout society. 
 
The trouble, of course, arises when considering the more misogynistic ways in which 
these progressive Islamic principles have been misconstrued in the fourteen centuries 
since Prophet Muhammad’s death. Interpretations of Islam that were institutionalized 
amidst a climate of patriarchal jurists and preexisting social stereotypes have remained in 
place for so long that they are often equated, or, more accurately, confused, with the 
essence of Islam itself. Religious leaders and organizations who subscribe to some of the 
resulting misogynist interpretations have immense amounts of historical precedent on 
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their side. When coupled with the reality that many people, including Muslims, are not 
overly cognizant of the exact wording of sources such as the Qur’an, leaders with 
misogynistic interpretations of Islam are given further credence, trusted with interpreting 
these allegedly complex texts for the rest of society’s benefit. As a result, some women—
especially those in less developed areas without ready access to education—blindly 
express preference for Islamic legal interpretations formulated at a certain time in history 
when patriarchy was deeply entrenched, without realizing their potentially negative 
ramifications depending on the bias or interpretative preference of the party in control.  
 
This issue is one that is clearly manifested in Iraq today. Chapter Three detailed the 
horrific ways in which physical and psychological violence is utilized against women in 
the name of Islam. A subset of Islamist groups purporting to espouse religious truths as 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad is instead manipulating them and taking many of 
their so-called “Islamic” beliefs ” out of context in the Qur’an and its asbab al-nuzul. As 
a result, women who initially may have been in support of religiously-oriented leaders are 
met with a sore surprise when they find their rights restricted and, at times, their lives 
endangered. Some political Islamist organizations and their associated militias view 
restrictions on women as a prime component of their “attempt to gain control, impose 
rules, and inscribe a new order rooted in narrow interpretations that are based on 
political-strategic considerations and ideological righteousness rather than a learned 
approach to religious texts and traditions.”254  
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The problem is neither Islam nor the prospect of an Islamic state; instead, it is the manner 
in which Islam is interpreted and applied. Indeed, the same religion that is used to support 
gender-based violence and misogyny can also be used to combat such acts. This 
viewpoint has not been particularly popular among some U.S. officials, who prefer 
secular approaches and strategies to combat Iraq’s many societal problems. Former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put forth a number of statements that not-so-
subtly suggest his thoughts about an Islamic state: “It simply won’t happen.”255 These 
feelings also extend beyond the U.S. government, as some powerful Iraqi women’s rights 
activists such as Yanar Mohammed, a member of the Organization of Women’s Freedom 
in Iraq (OWFI), believe that women’s equality is impossible unless a purely secular 
government is installed. It is those activists with such viewpoints who are embedded 
directly within the Iraqi population who pose perhaps the greatest challenge to any sort of 
reformulation of strategy based on Islamic ideals. Nevertheless, removing religion 
entirely from the equation is neither logical nor practical. Riverbend, after remarking 
upon one of Yanar Mohammed’s speeches, agrees and says: “If there were an Islamic 
government based purely on the teachings of Islam, women would be ensured of certain 
nonnegotiable rights.”256 
 
After all, Islamists are not unilaterally misogynistic and the issues chronicled in this 
thesis are those associated with a small, yet powerfully influential, subset of groups 
espousing religious ideologies. The violence and instability in Iraq today is ripe for the 
emergence of the form of fundamentalist Islamic groups who espouse a misogynistic 
view of women. Unfortunately, current realities do not suggest the emergence, at least 
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yet, of a more moderate, egalitarian Islamist movement prepared and ready to make the 
sorts of assertions made in this thesis. Frequently in Western countries, the term 
“Islamist” has come to possess an overwhelmingly negative connotation, automatically 
assumed to refer to fundamentalist or extremist groups. While it is true that some 
Islamists fit into this category, the term is much broader and deserves to be understood 
without any preexisting associations attached to it.257 “Islamism” as a concept means 
nothing more specific than “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups 
and organizations that pursue political objectives… [Islamism] provides political 
responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which 
rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.”258 
 
Though Iraq itself does not currently offer examples of more moderate Islamists, there 
are a number of illustrative and compelling instances from other countries that can be 
looked to for inspiration. For instance, Islamic reformists in Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco successfully utilized Islamic sources and principles to reform formerly 
misogynistic personal status laws in their respective countries.259 Moreover, the 
Malaysian organization Sisters in Islam continually makes enormous strides in its efforts 
to enact widespread legal and political reforms of women’s rights—efforts that are nearly 
entirely reliant on Islamic ideological principles and themes.260 The undeniable reality of 
the matter is that Islam is a critical and omnipresent cultural and religious force across 
many Muslim countries, notably including Iraq. Indeed, it is Islam’s widespread appeal 
and influence that even allows Islamist parties and militias to initially gain support. There 
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is no better way to counteract a more extreme or conservative manipulation of religion 
than through harnessing the same principles that at one point led to Islamists’ appeal.  
 
Activists such as Zainah Anwar of Sisters in Islam and Azizah al-Hibri of the U.S.-based 
Karamah, a group of Muslim female lawyers fighting for human rights, write and speak 
extensively on this matter, firmly believing that Islam itself is the key to protecting 
women’s rights both legally and physically. Al-Hibri makes a compelling statement in 
her article “Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights” when she 
formidably declares: 
The majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not be 
liberated through the use of a secular approach imposed from the outside by 
international bodies or from above by undemocratic governments. The only way 
to resolve the conflicts of these women and remove their fear of pursuing rich and 
fruitful lives is to build a solid Muslim feminist jurisprudential basis which clearly 
shows that Islam not only does not deprive them of their rights, but in fact 
demands these rights for them.261 
 
Eradicating religious principles and arguments does nothing to resolve the problems 
faced by women in Iraq today.  Quite to the contrary, it creates a new, and more 
profound, problem—namely, enforcing a system that is largely divorced from matters of 
the highest importance to the majority of Iraqis.  
 
In an interview with the author, Nadje al-Ali pointed out that some Iraqi women, 
preoccupied with the much more immediate concerns of survival, do not always feel as 
though the specific provisions of the new Iraqi Constitution or recently enacted 
legislation will have a critical impact on their lives, at least in the short-term. Removing 
religion entirely will only further compound these emotions and, if connected to U.S. 
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support and influence, could catalyze even greater backlash among those who feel as 
though their values are being undermined by foreign powers. Moreover, removing 
Islamic principles from reconstructive efforts suggests that there is something inherently 
misogynistic or violent about the religion itself, something that this thesis has attempted 
to refute. 
 
To be sure, the progressive interpretation of Islamic sources described in the second 
chapter, is itself rooted in interpretation. There is no way to unquestionably confirm that 
this analysis of the Qur’an and Prophet’s example is the only correct one, but this thesis 
attempts to strongly demonstrate the reasons it is the most compelling one. After all, at 
the end of the day, all religions are human interpretations of transcendent realities. Islam 
was revealed at a time when women had virtually no rights and thereby marked a 
dramatic transformation with regard to equality between men and women. The Qur’an, 
for instance, not only eradicated practices such as female infanticide and prohibitions 
against female inheritance and divorce, but it revolutionized the institution of marriage 
with its declarations of egalitarianism, companionship, love, and mutual support between 
husband and wife.  The overarching principles of gradualism and considerations of 
various meanings of key Arabic terminology addressed in Chapter Two further support 
the notion that Islam has within it many provisions to reinforce the establishment of 
egalitarian gender roles—roles that should only continue to progress with the 
development of society and the passage of time. In times of conflict, religion serves as a 
source of comfort, strength, and consistency on both an individual and communal level; 
Islam’s present role within Iraq is no exception. 
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Even above and beyond its capacity for spiritual and personal comfort, however, Islam 
embodies the necessary provisions for ensuring the very ideals that the United States has 
so desperately pledged to support—ideals such as freedom, equality, tolerance, and 
justice that we cherish within our own society. The Islamist groups described in the third 
chapter undermine some of these values when they inappropriately attribute patriarchal 
and misogynistic attitudes and violent actions to a religion that actually preaches the 
opposite. Islam must be separated from the manner in which it has been codified over 
time and instead considered in its original, unadulterated form as represented by the 
Prophet’s own example. Just as the inception of Islam revolutionized women’s roles 
during the time of Prophet Muhammad, so, too, can it serve as perhaps one of the most 
powerful mechanisms for eradicating religious-based violence and discrimination against 
women in the 21st century. Both men and women alike must be exposed to and educated 
on the sources of their faith, and accordingly challenged to confront those more extreme 
Islamist elements within society with even more compelling religious arguments to the 
contrary. It is naïve to expect Islam’s role within Iraqi society to diminish, no matter how 
staunch the attempts to exclude it from the legal sphere. Thus, we have before us an 
opportunity to help promote the existence of a state whose core religious principles and 
beliefs would necessitate a cessation of psychological and physical violence against 
women and the assurance of gender equality. Islam constitutes a potent force of 
inspiration and motivation for many of the Islamist groups in question, but it can be 
arguably just as powerful in unraveling religiously-justified misogyny.  
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